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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's 1990 decision, Employment Di-
vision v. Smith,' spawned a renaissance in state law protection of relig-
ious liberty. In Smith, the Court held that laws of general applicability
that had the effect of burdening an individual's religious faith no
longer need be justified by a compelling governmental interest, but
now would pass constitutional muster whenever there was a rational
basis for the law. Strict scrutiny would continue to be applied to laws
that contradicted an individual's religion only in three narrow cir-
cumstances: 1) the law purposefully interfered with free exercise of2
religion; 2) governmental action offended hybrid rights-not only
freedom of religion, but also a second fundamental right; or 3) the
government had a protocol for affording exceptions from the gener-
ally applicable rule, but denied religious exemptions from the law.
As the majority in Smith conceded, applying the rational basis test
to general laws that have the effect of burdening religion "will place
at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
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' 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2 Smith, 494 U.S. at 877; see Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993).
' Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82; see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997). The lower
courts have accorded varying interpretations to this exception. Compare EEOC v. Catholic Univ.
of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., 68 F.3d 525,
539 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that strict scrutiny is applied only where there is an "independently
viable" right beyond free exercise), with Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-L, 135 F.3d
694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that a "colorable" claim that another right is invaded trig-
gers the compelling interest/narrowly tailored test), and Kissinger v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio
State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (refusing to apply strict scrutiny to hybrid claims).
Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-84; see Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of
Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999); Black Hawk v. Pennsylvania, 114 F. Supp. 2d 327 (M.D.
Pa. 2000) (mem.) (granting motion for preliminary injunction because state failed to show least
restrictive means). See generally Carol M. Kaplan, The Devil Is in the Details: Neutra Generally Ap-
plicableLaws andExceptionsfrom Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (2000).
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engaged in."5  Members of non-mainstream faiths often lack the
numbers to inform or politically derail majoritarian legislation that
conflicts with their religious tenets.6 Before Smith, the courts ade-
quately protected minority religions by applying the compelling in-
terest/least restrictive alternatives test under the Free Exercise Clause
of the United States Constitution.7 After Smith, however, courts em-
ploying the rational basis test will reflexively sustain generally appli-
cable laws attacked under the federal Constitution. s
Congress has been unsuccessful in attempting to restore the com-
pelling interest/less restrictive alternatives test as a matter of federal
statutory law.9 At the same time, steady progress in securing minority
5 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
6 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Timothy L.
Hall, Omnibus Protections of Religious Liberty and the Establishment Clause, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 539,
553 (1999). See also Rosalie Berger Levinson, First Monday-The Dark Side of Federalism in the
Nineties: Restricting Rights of Religious Minorities, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 47, 51 (1998) ("The
Rehnquist Court's approach to the First Amendment religion clauses clearly demonstrates both
its willingness to protect majority interests and its unjustified use of federalism to invalidate laws
that would protect the rights of those who lack political power."); Martin S. Sheffer, God Versus
Caesar: Free Exercise, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and Conscience, 23 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV.
929, 969 (1998) ("The [Rehnquist] Court is simply insensitive towards the unfamiliar and the
different.").
' See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 689 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 732 (1986)
(O'Connor,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574, 604 (1983); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd.
of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
213-14 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 389, 406-07 (1963).
' Since the Supreme Court's holding in Smith, the federal courts have applied the rational
basis standard to deny a variety of free exercise claims. See Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202 (9th
Cir. 1999) (determining that a person's free exercise rights are not violated by a religiously neu-
tral, generally applicable requirement to furnish a social security number); Swanson v. Guthrie
Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that school board policy prohibiting
part time attendance by students does not invade the free exercise rights of parents who want to
home school for religious reasons); Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127
F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that church members who are denied use of a school audito-
rium for religious use in conjunction with a religiously neutral law have no free exercise claim);
Kissinger v. Bd. of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that a veterinary student's right
to freely exercise her religious beliefs were not offended because Ohio State University's cur-
riculum was generally applicable to all veterinary students and religiously neutral); Cornerstone
Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that there is no free ex-
ercise violation when the city's zoning law prevents a church from conducting services in area
zoned commercial); Rector of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d
Cir. 1990) (stating that the Free Exercise Clause is not contravened where a facially neutral
landmark designation hinders a church's ability to raise funds for charities and ministerial pro-
grams); Hubbard v. Buffalo Indep. Sch. Dist., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (determin-
ing that a school board's policy requiring proficiency testing for students who attend non-
accredited private schools or are home schooled is religiously neutral and generally applicable
and does not trammel a person's free exercise rights); Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R-I.
1990) (stating that Free Exercise Clause is not violated when an autopsy is performed pursuant
to a generally applicable and religiously neutral state law, even if it violates a religious belief).
' In 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-1 et seq. (1994). As its tide suggested, the statute set forth as its purpose "to restore the
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of
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religious freedom has been achieved by returning to state constitu-
tions-the original font of constitutional shelter for religious lib-
erty 0-° for strict scrutiny of general laws that have the effect of bur-
dening an individual's religious beliefs." This Article argues that
Article I, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, rooted in Wil-
1am Penn's vision of religious tolerance, generously safeguards non-
mainstream religions by demanding that government prove a com-
pelling interest and no less restrictive alternatives to sustain a law of
general applicability that has the effect of burdening the exercise of
an individual's religion.
While presented with the narrow issue of whether government
may invoke a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule under Ar-
ticle I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Edmunds decreed the criteria that
should be analyzed in assessing claims under any individual rights
provision of the charter. 2 Although the federal Constitution imposes
a floor for state protection of rights, United States Supreme Court
decisions construing the Bill of Rights do not bar the Pennsylvania
religion is substantially burdened." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1). In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997), the Supreme Court struck down RFRA as beyond Congress' power under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
On September 22, 2000, President Clinton signed the Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000). Relying upon its spending and
commerce powers, Congress instated the compelling interest/least restrictive alternative test for
burdens on religion imposed by land use regulations in programs that receive federal financial
assistance or that affect commerce, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-i (b), and burdens on religion imposed
on persons confined in institutions governed by the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1994), 42 U.S.C § 2000cc-l (a).
0 It was not until Cantwell v. Connecticu 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) that the Court held the
rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause to be fundamental, hence applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
" For commentary on this trend see David H.E. Becker, Free Exercise of Religion Under the
New York Constitution, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1088 (1999); Linda S. Wendtland, Note, Beyond the
Establishment Clause: Enforcing Separation of Church and State Through State Constitutional Provisions,
71 VA. L. REV. 625 (1985); Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise:
An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REV. 275 (1993); Daniel A. Crane, Beyond
RFRA: Free Exercise of Religion Comes of Age in the State Courts, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 235 (1998);
Aaron Gauthier, Free Exercise Jurisprudence Under the Michigan Constitution: Will Michigan Courts
Protect Religious Liberty, 3 T.M. COOLEYJ. PRAc. & CuNICAL L. 55 (1999); Tracey Levy, Rediscover-
ing Rights: State Courts Reconsider the Free Exercise Clauses of Their Own Constitutions in the Wake of
Employment Division v. Smith, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1017 (1994); Stuart G. Parsell, Revitalization of
the Free Exercise of Religion Under State Constitutions: A Response to Employment Division v. Smith,
68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 747 (1993); Vikram D. Amar, State Constitutions and the Workplace, 32
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 513 (1999); Glen V. Salyer, Free Exercise in Illinois: Does the State Constitution
Envision Constitutionally Compelled ReligiousExemptions?, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 197 (1998).
1" Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991) (holding that the state cannot as-
sert a good faith exception under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution to admit
evidence obtained by a search warrant that was issued without probable cause); see Common-
wealth v. Swinehart, 664 A2d. 957, 961 (Pa. 1995) (finding four-pronged analysis established in
Edmunds the salient point of departure for construction of Article I, Section 9 of Pennsylvania
Constitution). In Commonwealth v. Shaw, 770 A.2d 295, 298 n.2 (2001), however, the court ob-
served that while the Edmunds analysis is required for the briefs of litigants, courts are not re-
quired to assess the four criteria in their opinions.
Nov. 2001]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
courts from interpreting analogous provisions of the state constitu-
tion to afford wider privileges to the citizenry.'1 Deeming it "impor-
tant and necessary" to independently examine the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution, the Edmunds court announced that litigants should brief
and analyze four factors whenever presenting or defending a state
constitutional claim: 1) the text of the Pennsylvania constitutional
provision; 2) the history of the provision, including Pennsylvania
case-law; 3) related case-law from other states; and 4) considerations
of policy, including "unique issues of state and local concern, and
applicability within modern Pennsylvania jurisprudence.' 4 Each of
these factors points unmistakably to the conclusion that Article I, Sec-
tion 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution insists that an individual must
endure a burden on religion-whether a product of intent, igno-
rance or inadvertence-only where government proves a compelling
interest and that no alternatives less restrictive of religion exist to
achieve that interest.
I. TEXTUAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PENNSYLVANIA AND UNITED
STATES CHARTERS COUNTENANCE INDEPENDENT AND BROADER
PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY UNDER
THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION
The Edmunds court held that construction of the civil liberties
guarantees of the Pennsylvania Constitution should begin with the
text of the document. Even where the language of the state constitu-
tion is similar or identical to the text of the federal Constitution,
courts are not obliged to assign identical meaning to the provisions.)
The presence of significant differences in language weighs even more
forcefully in favor of independent interpretation of the two charters.'
6
'3 Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 894.
'4 Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895. See Ken Gormley, The Pennsylvania Constitution After Edmunds,
3 WIDENERJ. PUB. L. 55 (1993). For a time, the superior court held that failure to brief the four
Edmunds factors constituted waiver of the state constitutional claim. See In re F.B., 658 A.2d
1378, 1382-83 (Pa. Super. 1995); Commonwealth v. Brown, 654 A.2d 1096, 1099 (Pa. Super.
1995); Commonwealth v. Dorsey, 654 A.2d 1086, 1089 (Pa. Super. 1995). The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court later ruled that while addressing these factors was important, helpful, and en-
couraged, a litigant does not aive the state constitutional claim by neglecting to brief the four
criteria. See Commonvealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 899 (Pa. 1995); Commonwealth v. Swine-
hart, 664 A.2d 957 (Pa. 1995).
5 Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895-96. ROBERT E. WOODSIDE, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 7 (1985) ("The present Constitutions of the United States and Pennsylvania have many of
the same words as the eighteenth century documents, but not necessarily the same meaning
attributable to those words by lawyers, officials and laymen of that era.").
'6 See Kroger Co. v. O'Hara Township, 392 A.2d 266, 274 (Pa. 1978) ("While there may be a
correspondence in the meaning and purpose between the two, the language of the Pennsylva-
nia Constitution is substantially different from the federal constitution. We are not free to treat
that language as though it was not there. Because the Framers of the Pennsylvania Constitution
employed these words, the specific language in our constitution cannot be readily dismissed as
superfluous."); WOODSIDE, supra note 15, at 217-18 ("At times both state and federal courts
seem to put the two constitutions, or specific portions of them, in a mixer and then examine
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The distinct text of the religious liberty provisions of the Pennsylvania
Constitution lends protection to religious freedom that is not only
independent of, but also broader than, the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment.
A. The Fundamental Religious Liberty Clause of the Pennsylvania
Constitution Is Textually More Spacious than the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
The language of Article I, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion safeguards individual religious liberty more expansively than the
Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution. The First
Amendment expresses only the general proscription that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof.... ,7 By contrast, the Pennsylvania
Constitution uses significantly different language to prescribe a posi-
tive civil liberty:
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own consciences; no man can of right
be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to
maintain any ministry against his consent; no human authority can, in
any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience, and
no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious establishments
or modes of worship.' 8
The variance in text is more than semantic and stems from an un-
derstanding that federal and state constitutions were to perform dif-
ferent functions with regard to religion. Early state constitutions ex-
pressed a range of views as to the affirmative scope of freedom of
religion. On the other hand, in ratifying the First Amendment, the
States were unified behind a single proposition. "[B]ecause all be-
lieved that such matters [of religion] pertained to the states, and that
they were making explicit the fact that the federal government had
nothing to do with religion, no collision of their differing views as to
what constituted a violation of 'rights of conscience' took place."'9
the resulting mixture. This ignores the fact that state and federal constitutions were adopted at
different times by different people, under different circumstances to apply to different jurisdic-
tions, and contain different language which suggests different interpretations."). See also State
v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 965 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring) (holding that language "may
be so significantly different from the language used to address the same subject in the federal
Constitution that we can feel free to interpret our provision on an independent basis").
'U.S. CONST. amend. I.
"PA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
"THOMASJ. CURRY, THE FIRSTFREEDOMS 202 (1986). See also Robert C. Palmer, Liberties as
Constitutional Provisions 1776-1791, in LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY. CONsTITUTIONS AND RIGHTS IN
THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 55-56 (William E. Nelson & Robert C. Palmer II eds., 1987)
("The United States Constitution established a second-level and limited government that did
not completely supercede the states. Because it was different in kind and purpose from the
constitutions of the states, an evaluation of both powers and liberties within it must be altered.
Liberties, in the United States Constitution, were exceptions to power, not principles; the Con-
Nov. 2001]
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Accordingly, the pronounced textual differences between the United
States Constitution's general limit on the power of government to in-
vade religious liberty and the Pennsylvania Constitution's positive or-
dination of the contours of freedom of conscience make plain that
the state and federal charters should be interpreted independently.
The language of article I, section 3 dictates that just as govern-
ment must show a compelling interest to sustain laws that purpose-
fully restrict religion, government must prove a comparable interest
to uphold rules of general applicability that have the effect of com-
promising religious exercise. A longstanding maxim of constitutional
interpretation is that a court should look at the plain meaning of the
provision in question." The Pennsylvania Constitution prescribes
that the citizen's "right to worship.., according to the dictates of
[his] own conscience" is "indefeasible"-that is, not capable of being
annulled.' This is not true of most of the rights enshrined in the
Declaration of Rights; the only other liberties deemed indefeasible
are: a) "enjoying and defending life and liberty; 22 b) "acquiring, pos-
sessing and protecting property and reputation; "' c) "pursuing...
happiness;, 24 and d) the "right to alter, reform or abolish their gov-
ernment in such manner as they may think proper. "25 Religious lib-
erty is one of the select rights termed "indefeasible" because it is not
granted by the civil society, but rather, as a "natural" right, precedes
the establishment of a government.26 Therefore, to allow civil inter-
stitution had markedly little to do with the protection of individuals."); Stephen Botein, Relig-
ious Dimensions of the Early American State, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987) 315, 321-
22 ("In the late 1780's, only the most pessimistic of Antifederalists understood the new federal
government to be a true nation-state .... It was, instead, a government designed for certain
general purposes. It did not police or educate; it did not embody the immediate will of the
people. Compared with the governments of the several states, conceivably it was too distant
from the citizenry and too restricted in the scope of its responsibility to require an official relig-
ious dimension.").
"' See Collins v. Kephart, 117 A. 440 (Pa. 1921); THOMAS RAEBURN WHITE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA 12 (1907) ("A constitution is made, not particularly for
the inspection of lawyers, but for the inspection of the million, that they may read and discern
in it their rights and their duties; and it is consequently expressed in the terms that are most
familiar to them. Words, therefore, which do not of themselves denote that they are used in a
technical sense, are to have their plain, popular, obvious and natural meaning.") (internal cita-
tions omitted). WOODSIDE, supra note 15, at 58 ("Constitutional provisions are not to be read
in a strained or technical manner. Rather they must be given the ordinary, natural interpreta-
tion the ratifying voter would give them.") (citing Commonwealth v. Harmon, 366 A.2d 895,
897 (Pa. 1976)).
" Black's Law Dictionary defines "indefeasible" as a claim or right "that cannot be de-
feated, revoked or lost." BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 772 (7th ed. 1999).
PA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
24 Id.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Relig-
ion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1456 (1990) (referring to religious freedom as an "unalienable
right"). Black's Law Dictionary defines a "natural right" as "[a] right that is conceived as part of
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ests to trump religious exercise whenever the state has a rational basis
for a law would be entirely at odds with the words chosen to spell out
religious freedom in article I, section 3.
The succeeding language of article I, section 3 reinforces that as a
"natural and indefeasible" right, religious liberty is not to be readily
invaded by government. The Pennsylvania Constitution safeguards
the right a ainst any "human authority," which certainly includes the
legislature. The constitution not only constrains the legislature
from purposeful attempts to "control" the right of conscience; article
I, section 3 also bars legislation whose effect is to "interfere" with re-
ligious freedom. 8 Contrary to the language of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution, adoption of a rational basis test would, in virtually every cir-
cumstance, permit the interest of the "human authority" to "interfere
with" the individual's "indefeasible" right of religious conscience.
Conversely, requiring government to prove the same compelling in-
terest to sustain an "interference" with religious liberty caused by
rules of general applicability-as is admittedly necessary to uphold
legislation whose purpose is to "control" freedom of religion-is con-
sonant with the plain meaning of article I, section 3.
B. Related Provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution Secure
More Generous Protection of Religious Liberty than
the United States Constitution
While article I, section 3 most directly guarantees individual relig-
ious freedom, other provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution inti-
mate that the Framers intended to confer protection of individual re-
ligious liberty that was independent of-and ultimately more
generous than-the guarantee of free exercise later afforded by the
United States Constitution.2 The singular importance of religion
and religious liberty is acknowledged in the Preamble to the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution. "We, the people of the Commonwealth of Penn-
natural law and that is therefore thought to exist independently of rights created by govern-
ment or society." BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1323 (7th ed. 1999).
See also PA. CONST. art. I, § 26 ("Neither the Commonwealth nor any political subdivision
thereof shall deny to any person the enjoyment of any civil right, nor discriminate against any
person in the exercise of any civil right.").
2' The Oxford English Dictionary defines "control" as "3.a. [A] means adopted, esp. by the
government, for the regulation of prices, the consumption of goods, etc.; a restriction;" "4. To
exercise restraint or direction upon the free action of; to hold sway over, exercise power or
authority over, to dominate, command." 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 852-53 (2d ed.
1989). The definition of "interfere" includes, "4.a. To come into collision or opposition, so as
to affect the course of." 7 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY at 1102 (emphasis added).
2'SeeWHITE, supra note 20, at 13 ("It is the duty of the courts to so interpret the constitution
as to carry out the intention of the people who adopted it, and that intent must be gathered
from the instrument itself. The whole instrument should be examined, for only by so doing can
the courts gain a comprehensive idea of its purpose."); Seth F. Kreimer, The Right to Privacy in
the Pennylvania Constitution, 3 WIDENERJ. PUB. L. 77, 83 (1993) ("Pennsylvania's courts have
relied on the insights under one constitutional provision to give texture to cognate rights.").
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sylvania, grateful to Almighty God for the blessings of civil and relig-
ious liberty, and humbly invoking His guidance, do ordain and estab-
lish this Constitution." By contrast, the Preamble to the United
States Constitution3 1 makes no special mention of God or religious
freedom. The homage to religion in the Pennsylvania Preamble was
no accident; instead, " [i] t was the desire of the members of the con-
vention to go on record as recognizing the omnipotence and watch-
ful care of the Almighty and to express gratitude for the protection
which he had given to them and to their forefathers." 32
One of the most prominent differences in federal and state con-
stitutional treatment of the clash between individual religious faith
and the interests of government lies in provisions concerning the
military. Both constitutions confer upon the legislature the power to
maintain armed forces to assure the security of the body politic-a
national guard in the case of Pennsylvania,33 an army and navy at the
federal level.3 While it is difficult to imagine a stronger governmen-
tal interest than defense, the Pennsylvania charter, unlike the United
States Constitution, expressly authorizes the exemption from military
service of individuals who harbor religious objections. Article III, sec-
tion 16 provides:
The citizens of this Commonwealth shall be armed, organized and disci-
plined for its defense when and in such manner as may be directed by
law. The General Assembly shall provide for maintaining the National
Guard by appropriations from the Treasury of the Commonwealth, and
may exempt from State military service persons having conscientious scruples
against bearing arms.35
As will be discussed in the following analysis of the history of the
Pennsylvania Constitution,36 this Article codifies the Framers' allow-
ance that the demands of conscience-even if not shared by the ma-
jority of the populace-supersede civil obligations. The compelling
interest/least restrictive alternative test is more compatible with the
Framers' conception of religious liberty than permitting government
So PA. CONST. pmbl.
"'The Preamble to the United States Constitution provides:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the gen-
eral Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do or-
dain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
WHITE, supra note 20, at 29.
"PA. CONST. art. III, § 16.
"U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-16.
PA. CONST. art. III, § 16 (emphasis supplied).
See Part II, infra.
"The Pennsylvania Constitution also arguably places a greater premium on religious be-
lief in its term concerning qualifications for office. Article I, section 4 provides that "[n]o per-
son who acknowledges the being of a God and future state of rewards and punishments shall,
on account of his religious sentiments, be disqualified to hold any office.. .. " PA. CONST. art. I,
§ 4. The federal Constitution, while prohibiting any religious test as a prerequisite to holding
office, does not in turn mandate belief in God as a condition of service. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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to trammel religious practices whenever it has a rational basis for a
law of general applicability.
II. THE HISTORY OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 3 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTION CONFIRMS ITS INDEPENDENCE FROM THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS ITS AMPLE GUARANTEE OF
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY FORADHERENTS OF MINORITY FAITHS
Edmunds instructs that Pennsylvania courts and litigants also are to
explore the history of the state constitutional provision at issue to de-
ten-nine its meaning. The history of Article I, Section 3 of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution reveals that the article was not modeled after
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and for that reason
alone merits independent construction. Furthermore, the Pennsyl-
vania Framers considered religious obligations to be of higher order
than demands of the civil law and placed a premium on religious lib-
erty for majority and minority faiths alike. These historic findings
are consistent with interpreting article I, section 3 to insist that gov-
ernment prove a compelling interest rather than a mere rational ba-
sis to sustain interference with religious liberty effected by laws of
general applicability.
The present constitution emanates from three sources: the life
and philosophy of William Penn, colonial precursors to the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution, and the constitutional predecessors to the current
charter. Each of these sources manifests an overarching concern with
religious liberty in general, and protection of minority faiths in par-
ticular.
A. The Life and Philosophy of William Penn
The guarantee of religious liberty conferred by the text of the
Pennsylvania Constitution mirrors William Penn's original vision of
religious tolerance. 9 As a matter of history, whether the present
Pennsylvania Constitution requires a compelling interest or merely a
rational basis to uphold burdens on religion caused by majoritarian
laws of general applicability turns on the answer to a simple question:
"What would William Penn have said?" A brief examination of his life
and philosophy makes the answer obvious.
" SeeJohn C. Eastman, We Are a Religious People, Whose Institutions Presuppose a Supreme Being,
5 NExus 13, 15 (2000) (recognizing that the drafters of the Pennsylvania Constitution believed
that a republican government could not thrive if people were not allowed to develop their relig-
ious faith and virtue).
SeeJohn K. Alexander, Pennsylvania: Pioneer in Safeguarding Personal Rights, in THE BILL
OF RIGHTS AND STATES: THE COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES
309 (Patrick T. Conley &John P. Kaminsky eds., 1992) ("Pennsylvania's tradition of guarantee-
ing basic liberties in writing stemmed directly from William Penn's philosophy and experi-
ence.").
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Penn was born on October 14, 1644,40 the son of an English naval
commander.1  From early in his lifetime, Penn rebelled against ma-
joritarian faith. Penn was expelled from Christ Church College at
Oxford University for publicly criticizing the religious ceremonies of
the Anglican Church, the established Church of England at that
time. His parents then sent Penn to France where he studied at a
Protestant university with Moise Amyraut, another supporter of relig-
ious toleration.43
Penn's repudiation of mainstream religion was solidified with his
conversion to Quakerism and marriage to a Pand arri ge t a uaker wom an.4 Penn
became well acquainted with George Fox,4 the founder of the
Quaker religion, and began attending Quaker meetings even though
the government outlawed them. 6
Penn was imprisoned six times for speaking out for religious lib-
erty and, while in jail for these offenses, wrote many pamphlets at-
tacking intolerance.47 Penn was incarcerated in the Tower of London
for attacking the Catholic/Anglican doctrine of the Trinity and was
held for seven months because of his refusal to recant.48 Unwilling to
subjugate his religious views to the civil law, Penn stated "[m]y prison
shall be my grave before I will budge ajot; for I owe my conscience to
no mortal man."49 During this time, he wrote No Cross, No Crown, a
historical case for religious toleration.Y
Penn was again jailed following the passage of the Conventicle
Act, which suppressed religious dissent as sedition.5' While Parlia-
o See Jim Powell, William Penn, America's First Great Champion for Liberty and Peace, at
http://www.quaker.org/wmpenn.hunl.
.. See THE WORLD OF WILLIAM PENN 4 (Richard S. Dunn & Mary Maples Dunn eds., 1986)
[hereinafter WORLD OF PENN].
" See WILLIAM PENN AND THE FOUNDING OF PENNSYLVANIA 1680-1684: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 3-4 (Jean R. Soderlund et al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter FOUNDING OF PENNSYLVANIA].
("Thus in his late teens, William Penn was already questioning the authority of the church in
which he grew up and in doing so was challenging the right of his government to tell him what
to believe and how to worship.").
Powell, supra note 40.
" FOUNDING OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 42, at 4. ("The early Quakers were extreme
radicals, in a social as well as a religious sense .... The Quakers considered most aspects of
Christian tradition irrelevant: they had no need for ritual, for the sacraments, for an ordained
clergy."). WORLD OF PENN, supra note 41, at 6.
4A Pennsylvaniajudge recently noted of the Quaker leader:
A central idea in Fox's ideology was the doctrine of the Inner Light. Under this doc-
trine, individuals were thought to have the innate spiritual capacity to communicate di-
rectly with God. This doctrine was in opposition to established ecclesiastical doctrine of
the time and undermined the importance of religious ritual and clerics.
Chief Justice John P. Flaherty, William Penn, Lawgiver, THE PENNSYLVANIA LAWYER, Nov.-Dec.
2000, at 42.
See WORLD OF PENN, supra note 41, at 9; Powell, supra note 40.
Powell, supra note 40. For a summary of ways in which English law suppressed religious
liberty, see McConnell, supra note 26, at 1421-22.
48 Powell, supra note 40.
Id.
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ment passed this Act in order to curb the power of Catholics, the law
was applied most frequently against Quakers.2 Penn challenged the
law, which forbade the assembly of more than five adults for religious
worship except in Anglican churches,53 by holding a public Quaker
meeting.
By this time, Penn was internationally recognized for his views on
religious toleration. s He had long worked for liberty of conscience
and freedom of worship, including exemption from legal oaths, as a
way of guaranteeing the civil rights included in the Magna Carta.5
Penn's writings reveal two important themes. First, religious obliga-
tions are precedent to, and beyond the control of, the state. Sec-
ond, the stability of the body politic does not depend upon unity of
religious belief; rather, loyalty and prosperity will be increased by re-
ligious toleration and liberty of conscience.
Penn then shifted his efforts away from England towards establish-
ing a separate settlement in America where freedom of conscience
would be promoted. 9 Penn fulfilled the Quaker dream of founding a
colony in America when he received the charter to Pennsylvania from
King Charles H in 1681 as repayment of a debt of 16,000 pounds the
King owed to Penn's father. Penn's goal was to establish a moral,
yet tolerant, society in which people were granted freedom of con-
52Id.
SeeWILLIAM VISTAR COMFORT, WILLIAM PENN AND OUR LIBERTIES 62 (1947).
' After the jury acquitted the defendants, the Lord Mayor of London fined and impris-
oned the jury. Still, they would not change their verdict. After two months, the court of com-
mon pleas set them free. This case was instrumental in protecting the right to trial byjury. See
Powell, supra note 40.
See EDWARD CORBYN OBERT BEATy, WILLI PENN AS SOCIAL PHILOSOPHER 123 (1939).
" See COMFORT, supra note 53, at 73. Penn believed that the Magna Carta provided the
most support for freedom of conscience and worship. I&L at 133.
17 "Quakers denied the power of government over conscience, which led them to constant
disavowals of the right of the civil arm to punish them for their religious beliefs and practices."
CURRY, supra note 19, at 74.
See id at 74 (noting that a constant theme in Penn's writings was that "a ruler, rather
than creating among his citizens a smouldering hostility by forcing uniformity of belief or im-
poverishing dissenters by fines, should bind those citizens to himself in a common interest by
giving them liberty of conscience").
0 See Powell, supra note 40. Even after Pennsylvania was established, Penn continued to
work for religious toleration in England and used his political influence to aid imprisoned
Quakers. Penn's influence with the King led to the passage of The Acts of Indulgence, releas-
ing over one thousand Quakers fromjail. See FOUNDING OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 42, at 53.
Penn's influence lapsed for a time when King James II was overthrown and King William III
took the throne in 1688. Penn's connections with KingJames resulted in his arrest for treason
and the seizure of his property, including Pennsylvania. He was cleared, but subsequently
marked as a traitor again. John Locke finally helped to restore his name in 1694. See Powell,
supra note 40. Pennsylvania was again returned to Penn in 1694. See 1 PENNSYLVANIA: A
HISTORY 255 (George P. Donehoo ed., 1926).
6 The Charter granted Penn land in America between Lord Baltimore's colony in Mary-
land and the Duke of York's province in New York. In 1682, the area was increased when the
Duke of York deeded three counties to Penn, in what is now Delaware. See Pennsylvania State
History: The QuakerProvince: 1681-1776, at http://v.phmc.state.pa.us/bah/pahist/quaker.
asp?secid=31.
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science without fear of persecution. Pennsylvania became the site
for Penn's "Holy Experiment," bestowing religious freedom upon all
its colonists.
62
Because his ambition was to allow people from all religious back-
grounds to practice as they believed was right, Penn aggressively re-
cruited outside the Quaker faith.63  As proof of the success of his
campaign, the first settlers came from all over Europe. 64 As a conse-
quence, the colony was a bastion of religious pluralism:
That extraordinary figure William Penn created the "holy experiment" of
Pennsylvania as a sanctuary for the oppressed of Europe-the religiously
oppressed in particular-with toleration for all who believed in God.
Pennsylvania was a refuge for Quakers .... But Pennsylvania was also a
haven for a wide variety of sectarian and pietist groups from the Conti-
nent: Mennonites, Moravians, Dunkers, Amish, and other German sects,
for example. And it was important to many other groups as well: It wel-
comed Roman Catholics in a way that Puritan New England did not; Lu-
therans and Baptists would find welcome in Pennsylvania. 6s
It is patent that Penn would have rejected the notion that a law of
general applicability be permitted to infringe religious liberty merely
upon showing a rational basis for the law. First, the rational basis test
leaves non-mainstream faiths at the mercy of majoritarian legislation,
precisely what Penn sought to avoid in establishing the colony. "Tol-
eration meant to Penn freedom from interference with religious wor-
ship and exercises and exemption from civil disabilities on account of relig-
ion.66  Penn advocated that the Quakers be exempted from laws of
general agplicability concerning oaths, education, the military and
marriage. Second, Penn advocated that religious obligations super-
sede, and are beyond the province of, government. a To authorize
"' FOUNDING OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 42, at 5. Penn had also hoped to profit from
selling land in Pennsylvania; however, he lost money for a variety of reasons, including the ex-
pense of running the government. See FREDERIC A. GODCHARLES, PENNSYLVANIA: POLITICAL,
GOVERNMENTAL, MILITARYAND CIVIL 61 (1933); Powell, supra note 40.
" See Powell, supra note 40. See also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 551 (1997)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("These colonies [including Pennsylvania], though established as
sanctuaries for particular groups of religious dissenters, extended freedom of religion to
groups-although often limited to Christian groups-beyond their own.").
' FOUNDING OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 42, at 53; ALEXANDER, supra note 39, at 312-13.
See Commonwealth v. Beiler, 79 A.2d 134, 135 (Pa. Super. CL 1951) ("Their [Amish] ancestors
came to Pennsylvania in response to William Penn's personal invitation and his promise of re-
ligious liberty.").
FOUNDING OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 42, at 72.
WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRsT LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 205
(1987). See also Robert T. Handy, The Contribution of Pennsylvania to the Rise of Religious Liberty in
America, in QUEST FOR FAITH, QUEST FOR FREEDOM: ASPECTS OF PENNSYLVANIA'S RELIGIOUS
EXPERIENCE 19, 23-24 (Otto Reimherr ed., 1987) ("The liberal policy of toleration and the lack
of establishment, combined with the desire of Pennsylvania's leaders to attract immigrants, led
to an influx of persons from various religious backgrounds, many of them refugees from perse-
cution in Europe.").
BEATTY, supra note 55, at 127.
67 Id. at 129, 144.
In his Good Advice to the Church of England, Penn asserted that sovereignty over conscience
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government to enact laws that have the effect of limiting religious
practice simply by positing a rational civil goal turns Penn's hierarchy
on its head.
Perhaps the most germane expression of Penn's views on the ten-
sion between religious and civil obligation is set forth in his 1670
work, The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience. Among other things, Penn
responded to "objections" proffered by those opposing religious
freedom, including the protest that "at this rate ye may pretend to
Cut our Throats, and do all Manner of Savage Acts." 9 Penn an-
swered, "We are pleading only for such a Liberty of Conscience, as
preserves the Nation in Peace, Trade, and Commerce, and would not
exempt any man, or Party of men, from not keeping those excellent
Laws, that tend to Sober, Just and Industrious Living."7" As Professor
McConnell observes, a rational basis test would not restrict denial of
conscience-based exemptions to "excellent Laws," but would permit
governmental interests to take precedence over religious exercise in
most every instance.71 Consistent with his life's mission, Penn's Liberty
of Conscience contemplated a regime much closer to the compelling
interest standard-accepting that religious liberty would not be abso-
lute so as to insulate conduct that threatened the state but otherwise
demanding that civil obligations give way to an individual's religious
dudes.
B. Colonial Precursors to the Pennsylvania Constitution
Article I, section 3 of the present state charter traces its lineage to
colonial times. The terms of the colonial precursors to the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution make abundantly clear that, just as Penn envi-
sioned,7 2 absent compelling reasons individual religious conscience
was to predominate over the will of the majority expressed in legisla-
tive acts.
1. The West New Jersey Concessions
The first relevant document that defined freedom of religion was,
arguably, the West New Jersey Concessions ("Concessions"), written
rested in God, not in any human or governmental authority. See BFATTY, supra note 55, at 143.
See also Flaherty, supra note 45, at 47 ("Penn's religion emphasized the individual's power to
receive insight directly from God, and this religious individualism influenced his political ideas
of natural law and fundamental right.").
9WIfLAM PENN, THE GREAT CASE OF LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE 33 (London, 1670).
'0 Id at 34. See also WILIAM PENN, PERSWASIVE TO MODERATION 1 (London, 1686) ("I al-
wayes premise this Conscience to keep within the bounds of Morality, and that it be neither
Frantick nor Mischievous but a Good Subject, a Good Child, a Good Servant in all the affairs of
Life: as exact to yield to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, asjealous of withholding from God
the thing that is God's ....").
' See McConnell, supra note 26, at 1447-48.
SeeWILLIAM PENN, THE GREAT CASE OF LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (London, 1670).
Nov. 20011
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
in March 1676 and adopted by the proprietors, freeholders and in-
habitants of the province of West New Jersey. While there is debate
over whether William Penn aided in drafting the Concessions, he
signed the document and many of the principles of religious liberty
found in the Concessions are incorporated in Pennsylvania's colonial
charters.73 The religious freedom provision of the Concessions states:
That no Men nor number of Men upon Earth hath power or Authority to
rule over mens consciences in religious matters therefore it is consented
agreed and ordained that no person or persons whatsoever within the
said Province at any time or times hereafter shall be any waies upon any
pretence whatsoever called in question or in the least punished or hurt
either in Person Estate or Priviledge for the sake of his opinion, Judg-
ment faith or worship towards God in matters of Religion but that all and
every such person and persons may from time to time and at all times
freely and fully have and enjoy his and their Judgments and the exercise
of their consciences in matters of religious worship throughout all the
said Province.74
The Concessions codify two important features of religious liberty.
First, freedom of conscience is not subject to qualification by gov-
ernment, the representative of the "number of Men upon Earth. 
"7
5
Second, the right is sheltered not only against intentional burdening;
the Concessions ensure that no person is to be "in any waies upon
any pretense whatsoever called into question or the least bit punished
or hurt in Person Estate or Priviledge" based upon his religious belief
or practice. 76
7'Flaherty, supra note 45, at 43; BEATTY, supra, note 55, at 159 (noting that the Concessions
are believed to have been written primarily, if not completely, by Penn); 1 THE PAPERS OF
WILLIAM PENN 387-88 (Mary Maples Dunn & Richard S. Dunn eds., 1981) [hereinafter THE
PAPERS OF PENN]. Penn had helped promote and found Quaker settlement of the West New
Jersey colony. FOUNDING OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 42, at 96-97.
7, WEST NEWJERSEY CONCESSIONS CH. 16, reprinted in THE PAPERS OF PENN, supra note 73, at
396-97.
" That this right was considered fundamental and not alterable by majoritarian legislation
is further evidenced by its inclusion under the section of the Concessions entitled The Charter, or
fundamentall Laws of WestJersey agreed upon:
That these following concessions are the common Law or fundamentall Rights of the
province of West New Jersey. That the common Law, or fundamentall Rights and
priviledges of West NewJersey are Individually agreed upon by the Proprietors and free-
holders thereof to be the foundation of the Government which is not to be altered by
the Legislative Authority or free Assembly hereafter mentioned and constituted But that
the said Legislative Authority is constituted according to these fundamentalls to make
such Laws as agree with and maintaine the said fundamentalls and to make no Laws that
in the least contradict differ or vary from the said fundamentalls under what pretence or
allegation soever.
WEST NEWJERSEY CONCESSIONS CH. 13, reprinted in THE PAPERS OF PENN, supra note 73, at 396.
76 Religious freedom was not confined to a liberty to believe. The Concessions guarantee
not only the right to "freely and fully have and enjoy... Judgments," but further safeguard the
"exercise of their consciences." WEST NEWJERSEY CONCESSIONS CH. 16, reprinted in THE PAPERS
OF PENN, supra note 73, at 396-97.
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2. Fundamental Constitutions
The first document governing the Pennsylvania colony was the
Charter of Pennsylvania, by which King Charles II created Pennsylva-
nia and granted the land to William Penn. Penn's initial draft of the
Charter included a clause guaranteeing religious liberty; however
William Blathwayt, secretary to the Lords of Trade, eliminated the
provision. Religious liberty was indirectly furthered, however, as the
Charter did not require the colonists to attend Anglican services."
More significantly, Penn was given the power to make whatever laws
he chose, with the consent of the freemen of the Province and pro-
vided that they were not contrary to the laws of England.
Although the Charter granted Penn power to rule the colony,
Penn wanted Pennsylvania to be governed by people of different lan-
guages and customs who worshiped as each chose. s His first attempt
at drafting a document to accomplish this end was the Fundamental
Constitutions, written between 1681 and 1682.8' Possibly using the
West New Jersey Concessions as a source,s the Fundamental Consti-
tutions granted freedom of religion in its first clause:
Considering that it is impossible that any people or government should
ever prosper where men render not unto God that which is God's, as well
as to Caesar that which is Caesar's; and also perceiving the disorders and
mischiefs that attend those places where [there is] force in matters of
faith and worship; and seriously reflecting upon the tenure of the new
and spiritual government, and that both Christ did not use force and that
He did expressly forbid it in His holy religion, as also that the testimony
of His blessed messengers was that the weapons of the Christian warfare
were not carnal but spiritual; and further weighing that this unpeopled
country can never be planted if there be not due encouragement given
to sober people of all sorts to plant, and that they will not esteem any-
thing a sufficient encouragement where they are not assured, but that af-
ter all the hazards of the sea and the troubles of a wilderness, the labor of
their hands and sweat of their brows may be made the forfeit of their
conscience, and they and their wives and children ruined because they
FOUNDING OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 42, at 39.
The only time religion was even mentioned in the Charter was in a provision allowing
the bishop of London to appoint an Anglican preacher upon the request of twenty inhabitants.
The provision states:
And our further pleasure is, and we do hereby, for us, our heirs and successors, charge
and require that if any of the inhabitants of the said province, to the number of twenty,
shall at any time hereafter be desirous, and shall, by any writing or by any person de-
puted by them, signify such their desire to the Bishop of London, for the time being,
that any preacher or preachers, to be approved of by the said bishop, may be sent unto
them for their instruction, that then such preacher or preachers shall and may reside
within the said province without any denial or molestation whatsoever.
THE F NDAMENTAL CONSTTUTIONS OF PENNSYLVANIA PT. XX-I (1681), reprinted in FOUNDING OF
PENNSYLVANIA, Supra note 42, at 49.
See FOUNDING OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 42, at 49.
See id at 95.
See id. at 96.
2 See id-
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worship God in some different way from that which may be more gener-
ally owned. Therefore, in reverence to God the Father of lights and spir-
its, the author as well as object of all divine knowledge, faith, and wor-
ship, I do hereby declare for me and mine and establish it for the First
Fundamental of the government of my country, that every person that
does or shall reside therein shall have and enjoy the free possession of his
or her faith and exercise of worship towards God, in such way and man-
ner as every person shall in conscience believe is most acceptable to God,
and so long as every such person uses not this Christian liberty to licen-
tiousness (that is to say, to speak loosely and profanely of God, Christ, or
religion, or to commit any evil in their conversation), he or she shall be
protected in the enjoyment of the aforesaid Christian liberty by the civil
magistrate. Very good.
Although never enacted or signed by any settler, 4 as the first ar-
ticulation of religious liberty in Pennsylvania the Fundamental Con-
stitutions evidence the twin prongs of Penn's vision. First, religious
faith must be protected not only for mainstream orders, but equally
for persons who "worship God in some different way from that which
may be more generally owned., 85 Second, religious obligation is not
only preeminent to civic duty, but is a prerequisite to a successful civil
order. Hence the "civil magistrate" is required to safeguard "free
possession of his or her faith" as well as "exercise of worship towards
God, in such way as every person shall in conscience believe is most
acceptable."
8 6
The only qualification on free exercise imposed by the Funda-
mental Constitutions is that the citizen "not use this Christian liberty
to licentiousness. 8 7 This proviso is akin to Penn's The Great Case of
Liberty of Conscience, where he answered the charge that religious free-
dom would justify "all Manner of Savage Acts" with the concession
that such freedom "would not exempt any man... from not keeping
those excellent Laws, that tend to Sober, Just and Industrious Liv-
ing."ss As was true of Penn's writing, the limit on freedom of religion
espoused in the Fundamental Constitutions fits more comfortably
with a modem compelling interest test than one permitting the
populace to enact any general laws-whether or not "excellent"-that
have the effect of invading religion merely upon proffering any ra-
tional basis.89
See id. at 98-99.
See id. at 97.
Id. at 98-99.
'Id.
I7 d.
SeeWILLIAM PENN, THE GREAT CASE OF LIBERIYOF CONSCIENCE 33-34 (London, 1670).
See McConnell, supra note 26, at 1456-58, 1461-66. See also City of Boeme v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 554-55 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (finding provisos in state constitutions that
rights of conscience do not excuse acts of licentiousness "make sense only if the right to free
exercise was viewed as generally superior to ordinary legislation, to be overridden only when
necessary to secure important government purposes").
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3. The Laws Agreed Upon in England
Penn's next effort to provide for religious liberty in the colony was
The Laws Agreed Upon in England, which were to operate in con-
junction with his proposed First Frame of Government."0 The Laws
Agreed upon in England expressly granted religious freedom:
That all Persons living in this Province, who confess and acknowledge the
One Almighty and Eternal God, to be the Creator, Upholder and Ruler
of the World; and that hold themselves obliged in Conscience to live
peaceably and justly in Civil Society, shall in no Ways be molested or
prejudiced for their Religious Perswasion or Practice in matters of Faith
and Worship, nor shall they be compelled at any Time to frequent or
maintain any religious Worship, Place or Ministry whatever.9
The Laws Agreed Upon in England carry forth features of relig-
ious liberty that are consistent with applying the compelling interest
test to all infringements, whether purposeful or inflicted by neutral
laws of general applicability. The Laws safeguard the religious liberty
of all persons who believe in God, even if that faith is professed dif-
ferently than the religion of the majority. The civil government is
debarred not only from purposefully "molesting" one on account of
her religious views, but is prohibited from acting in a way that has the
effect of "prejudic [ing]" one based upon religion. The only limita-
tion on the primacy of religious conscience is that one "live peaceably
and justly" in the "Civil Society."
4. The Great Law
The Laws Agreed Upon in England were never approved by the
settlers of the colony and were superseded by the Great Law, enacted
by the Assembly convened in Chester in December 1682.9s The first
chapter of the Great Law guaranteed religious freedom in much the
same way as Penn had proposed in the Fundamental Constitutions
and Laws Agreed Upon in England:
"The Laws Agreed Upon in England were part of Penn's effort to distinguish the colony
based on its founding principles:
Laws Agreed Upon in England were meant to take the place of the laws applicable to the
area of Pennsylvania before Penn received his grant, the Duke of York's Laws, which had
been written on Long Island in 1664 and been made applicable, in 1676, to what was
later Pennsylvania.
UNITY FROM DIVERSITY: EXTRACTS FROM SELECTED PENNSYLVANIA COLONIAL DOCUMENTS, 1681
TO 1780, IN COMMEMORATION OF THE TERCENTENARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH 5 (Louis M.
Waddell ed., 1980) [hereinafter UNITYFROM DIVERSITY].
" The Laws Agreed Upon in England pt. XXXV (1682), reprinted in A COLLECTION OF
CHARTERS AND OTHER PUBLICK ACTS RELATING TO THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA, at 21
(Philadelphia, Franklin 1740).
" See id. The definition of "molest" in 9 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 973 (2d ed.
1989), includes "2.a. [t]o interfere or meddle with (a person) injuriously or with hostile intent"
The definition of "prejudice" includes "to affect injuriously or unfavourably by doing some act"
12 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY at 356 (emphasis added).
"See UNITYFROM DIVERSrIY, supra note 90, at 7.
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Almighty God, being Only Lord of Conscience father of Lights and
Spirits, and the author as well as object of all Divine knowledge, faith,
and Worship, who only can enlighten the mind, and persuade and con-
vince the understandings of people. In due reverence to his sovereignty
over the Souls of Mankind.
Be it enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That no person, now, or at any
time hereafter, Living in this Province, who shall confess and acknowl-
edge one Almighty God to be the Creator, Upholder and Ruler of the
world, And who professes, him, or herself Obliged in conscience to Live
peaceably and quietly under the civil government, shall in any case be
molested or prejudiced for his, or her Conscientious persuasion or prac-
tice. Nor shall hee or shee at any time be compelled to frequent or
Maintain anie religious worship, place or Ministry whatever, Contrary to
his, or her mind, but shall freely and fully enjoy his, or her, Christian
Liberty in that respect, without any Interruption or reflection. And if any
person shall abuse or deride any other, for his, or her different persua-
sion and practice in matters of religion, such person shall be lookt upon
as a Disturber of the peace, and be punished accordingly.
But to the end That Looseness, irreligion, and Atheism may not
Creep in under pretense of Conscience in this Province, Be It further En-
acted by the Authority aforesaid, That, according to the example of the
primitive Christians, and for the ease of the Creation, Every first day of
the week, called the Lord's day, People shall abstain from their usual and
common toil and labour, That whether Master, Parents, Children, or
Servants, they may the better dispose themselves to read the Scriptures of
truth at home, or frequent such meetings of religious worship abroad, as
may best suit their respective persuasions.
Like its predecessors, the Great Law protected minority and ma-
jority faiths alike, provided they believed in God. The Great Law de-
clared it to be a punishable breach of peace to "abuse or deride any
other, for his, or her different persuasion and practice in matters of
religion."95 Even the mandate to abstain from working on the first
day of the week acknowledged that one was free to pursue her faith as
she best saw fit--"to read the Scriptures of truth at home, or frequent
such meetings of relious worship abroad, as may best suit their re-
spective persuasions." Again, government was banned from both
"molest[ing] or prejudic[ing]" on account of one's religion while the
lone restraint on the right of religious liberty continued to be that
the right holder "[1] ive peaceably and quietly under the civil govern-
ment." 97
GREAT LAW, CH. 1 (1682), reprinted in CHARTER TO WILLIAM PENN AND LAWS OF THE
PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA PASSED BETWEEN THE YEARS 1682 AND 1700, at 107-08 (Harrisburg,
Hart 1879).
,Id
Id,
97I1&
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5. The Charter of Privileges
In 1701, Penn promulgated the Charter of Liberties (or Privi-
leges), which remained in effect until 1776 when the first Pennsylva-
nia Constitution was written. The very first provision of the Charter
of Privileges enshrined religious freedom:
Because noe people can be truly happy, though under the Greatest En-
joyment of Civil Liberties, if Abridged of the Freedom of theire Con-
sciences, as to their Religious Profession and Worship. And Almighty
God being the only Lord of Conscience Father of Lights and Spirits and
the Author as well as Object of all divine knowledge Faith and Worship
who only [can] Enlighten the mind, and perswade and Convince the un-
derstandings of people I doe hereby Grant and Declare, that noe person
or persons Inhabiting in this Province or Territories who shall Confesse
and Acknowledge one Almighty God the Creator upholder and Ruler of
the world and professe him or themselves Obliged to live quietly under
the Civill Governement, shall be in any case molested or prejudiced in
his or theire person or Estate because of his or theire Conscientious per-
swasion or practice nor be compelled to frequent or mentaine any Relig-
ious Worship place or Ministry contrary to his or theire mind or doe or
Suffer any other act or thing, contrary to theire Religious perswasion. 98
The Charter of Privileges embraced the dimensions of religious
liberty first codified in the West New Jersey Concessions and which
permeated the Fundamental Constitutions, the Laws Agreed Upon in
England and the Great Law. Freedom of religion extends to all per-
sons who believe in God, regardless of their particular religious ten-
ets.9 Government may neither purposefully "molest" nor act in a way
that will "prejudice" one's "person or estate" because of her religion.
The only circumstance under which government may place its inter-
ests above liberty of conscience is where exercise of religion would
violate the obligation "to live quietly under the civil government."
The Charter of Privileges singled out religious liberty for special
sanctuary. The Charter acknowledged that even if possessed of "the
Greatest Enjoyment of Civil Liberties," "noe people can be truly
happy... if abridged of the Freedom of theire Consciences as to
0 THE CHARTER OF PRIVILEGEs (1701), reprinted in 4 THE PAPERS OFPENN, supra note 73, at
104-06.
The assurance that no person be "compelled to ... mentaine any Religious Worship
Place" also served to protect minority faiths. In Pennsylvania, "[t]here was no established
church to bend the conscience of men and to inflict pain and penalty for nonconformity to
creed or dogma." WAYWOOD FULLER DUNAWAY, A HIsToRY OF PENNSYLVANIA 35-36 (1948).
Religious equality, however, was not unbounded. The Charter of Privileges limited gov-
ernment office to Christians. THE CHARTER OF PRIVILEGEs (1701), reprinted in 4 THE PAPERS OF
PENN, supra note 73, at 104-06. ("[A]lI persons who also professe to believe in Jesus Christ the
Saviour of the world shall be capable (notwithstanding theire other perswasions and practices
in point of Conscience and Religion) to Serve this Governement in any capacity both Legisla-
tively and Executively .... ."). While discriminatory against non-Christians in this regard, the
religious requirement was liberal for its time in that it enfranchised Roman Catholics, who were
barred even from voting in most colonies. Alexander, supra note 39, at 309.
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theire Religious Profession and Worship."'00 Accordingly, the Charter
fully and forever insulated the right from governmental invasion:
And noe Act Law or Ordinance whatsoever shall at any time hereafter be
made or done to Alter Change or Diminish the forme or Effect of this
Charter or of any part or Clause therein Contrary to the True intent and
meaning thereof without the Consent of the Governour for the [time be-
ing and] six parts of Seven of the Assembly [mett] But because the hap-
piness of Mankind Depends So much upon the Enjoying of Libertie of
theire Consciences as aforesaid I Doe hereby Solemnly Declare Promise
and Grant for me my heires and Assignes that the first Article of this
Charter Relateing to Liberty of Conscience and every part and Clause
therein according to the True Intent and meaneing thereof shall be kept
and remaine without any Alteration Inviolably for ever.' °1
While no liberty in the Charters of Privileges could be altered absent
approval of six-sevenths of the legislators, the religious freedom pro-
vision was placed entirely beyond the power of the legislature, to be
"kept and remaine without any Alteration Inviolably forever."
The provisions of the Laws Agreed Upon in England, the Great
Law and the Charter of Privileges afforded greater asylum to religious
liberty in Pennsylvania than the laws of any colony.1°2 "It was a decla-
ration not of toleration but of religious equality, and brought within
its protection all who confessed one Almighty God-Roman Catholics
and Protestants, Unitarians and Trinitarians, Christians, Jews and
Mohammedans, and excluded only Atheists and Polytheists."03 This
equality stemmed from Penn's belief that the duty to religion pre-
ceded and superceded obligations to secular society, and that the se-
curity of body politic is enhanced by promoting rather than quashing
the diverse ways in which individuals choose to relate to the Creator.
Accordingly, government was dis-empowered from either purpose-
fully molesting or in effect prejudicing an individual because of his
religious belief or practice, so long as the citizen lived peaceably in
the community. Codifying William Penn's vision, the colonial pre-
cursors to the Pennsylvania Constitution are wholly incompatible with
a rational basis test for neutral rules of general applicability that
would permit the majority to routinely burden the religion of minor-
ity faiths.
'oo CHARTER OF PRIVILEGES (1701), reprinted in 4 THE PAPERS OF PENN, supra note 73, at 106.
10 Id. at 108.
'o See CURRY, supra note 19, at 75 ("Pennsylvania from its beginnings, however, established
perhaps the broadest religious liberty in colonial America, and its government provoked no
serious charges of persecution."); Alexander, supra note 39, at 311 ("Pennsylvania, which never
instituted an established religion and never faced a serious charge of religious persecution,
joined Rhode Island in offering the inhabitants the greatest degree of religious liberty in colo-
nial America.").
" HON. MICHAEL WILLIAM JACOBS, THE GUARANTIES OF LIBERTY IN THE EARLY LAW OF
PENNSYLVANIA (1907).
[Vol. 4:1
CODA TO WILIAM PENN'S OVERTURE
C. Constitutional History of Article I, Section 3
Pennsylvania has held five constitutional conventions since the
American Revolution, resulting in the Constitutions of 1776, 1790,
1838, 1874, and 1968.104 Each of these constitutions perpetuated the
broad ambit of religious liberty for minority and majority faiths alike
that was envisioned by William Penn and captured in the colonial
charters.' °5
1. 1776 Constitution
The first Constitution for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
consisting of a Declaration of Rights and a Frame of Government, was
adopted in 1776.0' Section 46 of the Frame of Government pro-
nounced the Declaration of Rights "to be a part of the constitution of
this Commonwealth" which "ought never to be violated on any pre-
tence whatever.' 0 7 To fully appreciate the significance of the provi-
sions of the Declaration of Rights protecting freedom of religion, it is
first necessary to examine the religious composition of the Com-
monwealth as well as the political role of its sects.' 8
As of 1776, the diverse religions in Pennsylvania were divided
among three geographic regions of the Commonwealth. The Phila-
delphia area-Chester, Bucks and Philadelphia counties-had been
settled by English of Quaker, Episcopalian and Baptist faiths who oc-
cupied the wealthy and aristocratic stratum of society. Their financial
status assured that members of these religions would wield the bulk
of political power, for the requirement that one own property as a
" For an overview of the process by which these constitutions were adopted, see
VOODSIDE, supra note 15, at 9-10, 567-81; PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1967-1968, A HISTORY OF PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONS,
REFERENCE MANUAL No. 3 (1968) [hereinafter HISTORY OF PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONS].
" See CURRY, supra note 19, at 160.
For detailed analyses of the history and impact of the 1776 Constitution, see J. PAUL
SELSAM, THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776: A STUDY IN REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY
(1936); ROSALIND L. BRANNING, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1960); WHITE,
supra note 20; William Bentley Ball, 77Te Religion Clauses of the Pennsylvania Constitution, 3
WIDENERJ. PUB. L. 709, 713-16 (1994); Robert F. Williams, The State Constitutions of the Founding
Decade: Pennsylvania 's Radical 1776 Constitution and Its Influences on American Constitutionalism, 62
TEMiP. L. REV. 541 (1989); and Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right To BearArms in the First State Bills
of Rights: Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Vermont and Massachusetts. 10 VT. L. REV. 254, 266-75
(1985).
'07 PA. CONST. of 1776, FRAME OF GOVERNMENT § 46.
' For an analysis of the religious composition of early Pennsylvania and its impact on
Pennsylvania politics, see E. Theodore Bachmann, Penn's "Holy Experiment" in Context: Some As-
pects of a Nascent Ecumenism as Seen in the Lutheran Involvement (1638-1762), in QUEST FOR FAITH,
QUEST FOR FREEDOM: ASPECTS OF PENNSYLVANIA'S RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 41 (Otto Reimherr
ed., 1987); O.S. Ireland, The Crux of Politics: Religion and Party in Pennsylvania, 1778-1789, 42
WM. & MARY Q. 453 (1985); O.S. Ireland, The Ethnic-Religious Dimension of Pennsylvania Politics,
1778-1779, 30 WM. & MARY Q. 423 (1973).
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qualification to vote sapped the influence of non-Quakers. 1°" German
farmers of Reformed or Lutheran religious conviction as well as pie-
tistic sects of Moravians, Schwenkfelders, Mennonites and Dunkers
dominated the middle of the state. Members of these faiths were
primarily middle class and largely followed the political lead of the
Quakers.1 ° Finally, the western frontier was populated by Scotch-Irish
Presbyterian small farmers, whose debt not only disadvantaged them
economically, but deprived them of representation in the govern-
ment."' One of the leading adverse consequences of the Presbyteri-
ans' lack of franchise was the inability to protect their frontier homes
and land during the frequent periods of war. Because of their relig-
ious based conscientious objection, the Quakers, who controlled the
government, refused to support the raising of arms."
2
While the Quakers dominated the pre-revolutionary government,
it was the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians who exerted primary sway over
the 1776 Constitution. The Presbyterians were enfranchised by one
of the first acts of the Provincial Conference that assembled in Phila-
delphia on June 18, 1776-the abrogation of the requirement that
one own property amounting to fifty pounds in order to vote for
delegates to the state constitutional convention. 3  Furthermore,
"[s]ince the Quakers, the conservatives, and the German sectarians
opposed to war had little or nothing to do with the movement for a
constitution, and since the great leaders of Pennsylvania like Wilson,
Dickson, Franklin, Morris and others were busily engaged in Con-
gress or serving in the army, the Presbyterian influence was all power-
ful" at the convention called to draft the state constitution. 114 Despite
the ascendancy of a religious sect that had been prejudiced by the
lack of franchise and left vulnerable by the Quaker conscientious ob-
jection to war, the document that the constitutional convention pro-
duced codified Penn's ideal of religious freedom and tolerance. In
109 SELSAM, supra, note 106, at 2; BRANNING, supra note 106, at 9-10.
"o SELSAM, supra note 106, at 6; BRANNING, supra note 106, at 9-10.
... SELSAM, supra note 106, at 6; BRANNING, supra note 106, at 9-10.
. The Quaker-dominated Assembly refused to lend support to the King William War in
1689; Queen Anne's War in 1701; the 1739 War of Jenkin's Ear, which merged into King
George's War; and the French and Indian War, where fighting occurred within the boundaries
of Pennsylvania. See SELSAM, supra note 106, at 18-25. When Governor Thomas sent a message
to protest the Assembly's refusal to support King George's War, the Assembly charged him with
overthrowing the liberties of the people." Id. at 22.
"' PROCEEDING OF THE PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEES OF THE PROVINCE OF
PENNSYLVANIA, JUNE 20-21, 1776, reprinted in THE PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO CALLING THE
CONVENTIONS OF 1776 AND 1790, at 38 (Harrisburg, Wiestling 1825) [hereinafter
PROCEEDINGS]; SELSAM, supra note 106, at 138; HISTORY OF PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONS, su-
pra note 104, at 2.
114 SELSAM, supra note 106, at 150. See also HISTORY OF PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 104, at 1. ("Pennsylvania's convention was called not by the colonial assembly, which was
under the control of the eastern conservatives, but by a provincial conference of the commit-
tees of correspondence of all the counties convoked by the committee of the city of Philadel-
phia. These were wholly extralegal bodies in which persons disenfranchised under the existing
property qualification and rigid naturalization procedures could and did participate.").
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fact, the Address to the People of Pennsylvania, crafted by a committee of
the Provincial Conference to announce the convention, urged that a
change of government was "absolutely necessary, to secure property,
liberty and the sacred rights of conscience, to every individual in the
province. "n5
Although the Declaration of Rights is often touted as being mod-
eled after the Virginia Declaration of Rights," 6 Pennsylvania's religion
clause departed from the Virginia charter to cut a wider swath of re-
ligious liberty. 7 Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights
in the 1776 Constitution provided:
That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their own consciences and understand-
ing: And that no man ought or of right can be compelled to attend any
religious worship, or erect or support any place of worship, or maintain
any ministry, contrary to, or against, his own free will and consent: Nor
n5 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 113 at 41-42; WHITE, supra note 20, at xxii.
6 The linkage may be attributable to the fact that Madison shared Penn's view that the
duty to religion superseded civil obligations:
It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as
he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent both in order of time and
degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society .... [I]n matters of Religion, no
man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and that Religion is wholly
exempt from its cognizance.
JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS, reprinted in
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 64 (1947) (Appendix to Rutledge,J., dissenting).
117 See BERNARD SCHwARTZ, 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 262 (1971).
In a letter to William Bradford, Jr. of Pennsylvania written on April 1, 1774, James Madison ac-
knowledged that colonial Pennsylvania was far more munificent in its treatment of minority
faiths than Virginia:
Our Assembly [of Virginia] is to meet on the first of May When It is expected some-
thing will be done in behalf of the Dissenters: Petitions I hear are already forming
among the Persecuted Baptists and I fancy it is in the thoughts of the Presbyterians also
to intercede for greater liberty in matters of Religion. For my part, I cannot help being
very doubtful of their succeeding in the Attempt .... The Sentiments of our people of
Fortune & fashion on this subject are vastly different from what you have been used to.
That liberal catholic and equitable way of thinking as to the rights of Conscience, which
is one of the Characteristics of a free people and so strongly marks the People of your
province is but little known among the Zealous adherents to our Hierarchy....
You are happy dwelling in a Land where those inestimable privileges are fully enjoyed
and public has long felt the good effects of their religious as well as Civil Liberty.
JA.MES MADISON, WRITINGS 7-9 (Library of America 1999). See also MILLER, supra note 65, at 37-
38 ("The middle colonies did not offer a striking defense of religious liberty for the opposite
reasons: They had already attained it, or something close to it. Pennsylvania, the weightiest of
them, had been from the beginning not far from the ideal that Madison wanted, through the
courtesy of its Quaker founder William Penn."); Alexander, supra note 39, at 327 ("American
revolutionaries in other states, including James Madison, often cited Pennsylvania's develop-
ment to support the case for embracing religious toleration or to attack the practice of creating
an established church.").
The fact that the Pennsylvania Constitution was more expansive in its treatment of relig-
ious freedom than the Virginia Declaration of Rights further supports interpreting the state
constitution independent of and more broadly than the Free Exercise Clause of the United
States Constitution. For the United States Supreme Court has viewed the Virginia Declaration
of Rights "as particularly relevant in the search for the First Amendment's meaning." McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,437 (1961).
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can any man, who acknowledges the being of God, be justly deprived or
abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on account of his religious senti-
ments or peculiar mode of religious worship: And that no authority can
or ought to be vested in, or assumed by any power whatever, that shall in
any case interfere with, or in any manner control, the right of conscience
in the free exercise of religious worship.' 8
This provision embraces many features of the rights that derive
from the colonial precursors and persist in the present constitution.
The right to worship God is "natural and unalienable." "No author-
ity"-including government-is empowered to "in any manner con-
trol" or "in any case interfere" with the free exercise of worship." 9
The 1776 Constitution acknowledges the equivalent protection to be
accorded non-majoritarian faiths, enjoining dispossession of any civil
right due to "the citizen's religious sentiments or peculiar mode of
worship.',
20
The preamble to the 1776 Constitution confirms the commitment
to the liberty of adherents of all persuasions. The preamble docu-
ments the Framers' belief that
[I] t is our indispensable duty to establish such original principles of gov-
ernment, as will best promote the general happiness of the people of this
State, and their posterity, and provide for future improvements, without
partiality, for, or preiudice against any particular class, sect or denomination of
men whatever....
There is perhaps no better example of the Framers' endorsement
that individual faith occupies a higher plane than the civil needs of
the collective than the provision of the Declaration of Rights con-
cerning the common defense. It must be recalled that the Scotch-
Irish Presbyterian farmers who controlled the convention had been
victimized by the pacifist religious beliefs of the Quaker-dominated
colonial Assembly, which had rendered the farmers impotent to de-
fend their property in times of war. Nonetheless, the 1776 Constitu-
tion continued to respect the religious liberty of the Quakers, ex-
empting "any man who is conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms"
from being compelled to do so, "if he will pay such equivalent. "'2
"8 PA. CONST. of 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, cl. 2. By comparison, the 1776 Virginia
Declaration of Rights stated: "That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the
manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or vio-
lence; and therefore all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to
the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practise Christian forebear-
ance, love and charity, towards each other." VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 16 (1776), reprinted
in SCmwARTZ, supra note 117, at 236. In departing from the language of the Virginia Declara-
tion of Rights, the Pennsylvania Constitution "granted practically the same protection as that of
Penn's Charter of Privileges." SELSAM, supra note 106, at 180.
19 The dictionaries of the time defined "exercise" to include not only belief but conduct.
McConnell, supra note 26, at 1489.
' PA. CONST. of 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, cl. 2 (emphasis supplied).
... PA. CONST. of 1776 pmbl. (emphasis supplied).
1' PA. CONST. of 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, cl. 8. The New Hampshire and Vermont
constitutions were the only other state constitutions to similarly provide this protection.
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While not apparent on its face, the provision of the 1776 Constitu-
tion concerning the oath of office also operated to broaden religious
tolerance. Section 10 of the Frame of Government required all
members of the legislature to take the following oath: "I do believe
in one God, the creator and governor of the universe, the rewarder of
the good and the punisher of the wicked. And I do acknowledge the
Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given by Divine inspi-
ration."'3 While obviously barring disciples of certain faiths, this oath
served to end the exclusion of Roman Catholics from office that the
oath had exacted in colonial times. 124 The residual impact of the oath
was further ameliorated by the immediately succeeding provision that
"no further or other religious test shall hereafter be required of any
civil officer or magistrate of this State." " This clause was inserted at
the behest of Benjamin Franklin. While preferring that the mandate
to acknowledge the divine inspiration of the Scriptures be omitted,
Franklin concluded that the added clause limited to legislators the
class of persons required to make the affirmation.
126
Finally, section 45 of the Frame of Government offered additional
security to religious faith, providing:
[A]II religious societies or bodies of men heretofore united or incorpo-
rated for the advancement of religion or learning, or for other pious and
charitable purposes, shall be encouraged and protected in the enjoyment
of the privileges, immunities and estates which they were accustomed to
enjoy, or could of right have enjoyed, under the laws and former consti-
127tution of this state.
References to religion in this proviso were added to assuage concerns
of Christian ministers that their followers' ability to pursue their faith
could be compromised by a ruling class of 'Jews, Turks, Spinozists,
Deists, perverted naturalists."'28 Like other portions of the new con-
SELSAM, supra note 106, at 179 n.33.
'2PA. CONST. of 1776, FRAME OF GOVERNMENT, § 10.
"2 Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 403 (Pa. 1824). "[F]rom 1693 to
1776... every candidate for office had to swear that he did not believe in the doctrine of tran-
substantiation, that he regarded the invocation of the Virgin Mary and the saints as supersti-
tious and the Popish Mass as idolatrous." SELSAM, supra note 106, at 179. "At a later date every
prospective office-holder was compelled to declare his belief in the Athanasian definition of the
Holy Trinity. Penn undoubtedly opposed these tests but he was powerless to act. They imposed
civil disabilities on Catholics, Socinians or Unitarians, Jews and Infidels." Id at 179 n.35; UNITY
FROM DIVERSrrY, supra note 90, at 79; Alexander, supra note 39, at 323.
The new oath may have originated in the oath that the Provincial Conference required of
delegates to the Constitutional Convention, which was "a return to the original idea of liberty of
conscience held by William Penn." SELSAM, supra note 106, at 140 n.12; WHrrE, supra note 20,
at xxiii.
. PA. CONsT. of 1776, FRAIE OF GOVERNMENT, § 10.
'- SELSAM, supra note 106, at 180; WHrrE, supra note 20, at xxiv, 45; MORTON BORDEN,
JEWS, TURKSAND INFIDELS 11 (1984).
'7 PA. CONST. of 1776, FRAME OF GOVERNMENT, § 45.
" SELSAM, supra note 106, at 217. See also BORDEN, supra note 126, at 11. While still biased
in favor of Christian faith in general, "[c]onsidering the times, the framers of the constitution
were very liberal in regard to religion. Besides Pennsylvania only Delaware and Rhode Island
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stitution, pains were taken to guarantee that those who ran the new
civil order would not trammel the religious liberty of members of
other sects in the Commonwealth.
2. 1790 Constitution
Primarily because of dissatisfaction with the structure of govern-
ment fixed by the 1776 Constitution,'2 another constitutional con-
acknowledged the equality of all Protestant sects, and only Pennsylvania extended equality to
Catholics." SELSAM, supra note 106, at 180-81. The apparent dichotomy in the 1776 Constitu-
tion between promoting Christianity in general while guaranteeing religious liberty of dissent-
ers was not unique to Pennsylvania but rather typified state constitutional efforts to promote the
personal and societal virtues offered by religion in a pluralistic body politic. As Professor Onuf
explains:
Most of the founders agreed that Protestant Christianity provided the best support for
republican virtue. Because, in the words of Benjamin Rush, "a Christian cannot fall of
being a republican," it was obviously advisable for American republics to support Christi-
anity. But what sort of state support would be broadly acceptable in a pluralistic religious
environment? Experience in the colonies and new states showed that religious estab-
lishments generated sectarian divisions and offended many devout Christians.
Efforts to establish Christianity, even where sectarian diversity precluded actual state
support, show how concerned constitution writers were with fostering popular piety and
virtue. But most of the new charters also incorporated provisions that acknowledged in-
dividual rights of conscience and, south of New England, disavowed any preference for a
particular sect .... Republicanism may have depended on Christianity, but respect for
religious freedom and the threat of sectarian hostility precluded the new state govern-
ments from cultivating the popular piety and virtue which alone could sustain them.
Peter S. Onuf, State Politics and Republican Virtue, in TOWARD A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 94-95 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991).
Professor Onuf further observes that at the time of the American Revolution, most clergy
accepted the necessity of religious freedom for those who did not accept mainstream religious
dogma. "By the time of the Revolution, most established clergymen in New England... were
increasingly wary about invoking state power to uphold their prerogatives or curb dissent ....
The moral authority of the clergy was not based on unthinking popular deference to the minis-
terial office but instead depended on their enthusiastic advocacy of civil and religious liberties.
Id. at 99. See also McConnell, supra note 26, at 1465-66.
"' SeeBRANNING, supra note 106, at 17-20; HISTORY OF PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 104, at 4-5. The delegates approved the following resolutions as to the objects of the con-
vention:
I. That the legislative department of the constitution of this commonwealth requires al-
terations and amendments, so as to consist of more than one branch, and in such of the
arrangements that may be necessary for the complete organization thereof.
II. That the executive department of the constitution of this commonwealth should be
altered and amended, so that the supreme executive power be vested in a single person,
subject however to proper exceptions.
III. That the judicial department of the constitution of this commonwealth should be al-
tered and amended, so that the judges of the supreme court should hold their commis-
sions during good behavior, and be independent as to their salaries, subject however to
such restrictions as may hereafter be thought proper.
IV. That the constitution of this commonwealth should be so amended as that the su-
preme executive department should have a qualified negative upon the legislature.
V. That the part of the constitution of the commonwealth, called "A declaration of the
rights of the inhabitants of the commonwealth or state of Pennsylvania," requires altera-
tions and amendments, in such manner as that the rights of the people, reserved and
excepted out of the general powers of government, may be more accurately defined and
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vention was called in 1789. There was very little debate over or
change to the religious liberty provisions of the constitution of
1776.30 Former section 2 of the Declaration of Rights of 1776 was re-
enacted as section 3 of article IX:
That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their own consciences; that no man can
of right be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or
to maintain any ministry, against his consent; that no human authority
can, in any case whatever, controul or interfere with the rights of con-
science; and that no preference shall ever be given, by law, to any relig-
ious establishments or modes of worship.'31
If anything, the modest deviations from section 2 of the 1776 Dec-
laration of Rights strengthened the protection of non-mainstream
faiths and expanded the contours of religious freedom. Where the
1776 Constitution precluded any authority from controlling or inter-
fering with "the rights of conscience in the free exercise of religious wor-
ship," the 1790 Constitution omitted the italicized language, no
longer limiting to religious worship the activities safeguarded. 2 The
clause from the constitution of 1776 stating "Nor can any man, who ac-
knowledges the being of God, be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as
a citizen, on account of his religious sentiments or peculiar mode of religious
worship" was removed from the general guarantee of religious liberty
embodied in article IX, section 3."3 Because the earlier clause
shielded only persons "who acknowledge the being of God," the 1790
Constitution arguably brought non-believers within the right of con-
science. A memorial from the members of the Quaker faith pre-
sented to the convention applauded the general religious liberty
secured, and the same and such other alterations and amendments in the said constitu-
tion as may be agreed upon, be made to correspond with each other.
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 113, at 149-53 (Dec. 9, 1789).
... See HISTORY OF PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 5 ("The rights of the
people under the bill of rights remained unchanged, for these were issues on which liberals and
conservatives were agreed.").
... PA. CONSr. of 1790, art. IX, § 3.
McConnell, supra note 26, at 1461 (emphasis supplied).
IS See Ball, supra note 106, at 716. In the constitution of 1790, the "acknowledgment of
God" clause was moved to article IX, section 4, which stated "[tihat no person, who acknowl-
edges the being of a God and a future state of rewards and punishments, shall, on account of
his religious sentiments, be disqualified to hold any office or place of trust or profit under this
commonvealth." Hence the mandate that one acknowledge the being of God no longer was a
pre-condition to the general protection of religious liberty, but served the more limited aim of
acting as a prerequisite to assuming public office. See id.
The convention rejected a proposed amendment to eliminate the requirement that one
holding public office "acknowledge[ ] the being of a God and a future state of rewards and
punishments," as well as an offer to substitute the provision that "[n]o religious test shall ever
be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under this constitution."
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 113, at 218-19 (Feb. 19, 1790); id. at 377 (Feb. 3, 1790). The delegates
also rejected a proposal to omit the words "and a future state of rewards and punishments" and
to insert instead after the word "God" the phrase "the rewarder of the good and punisher of
wicked." Id. at 218 (Feb. 19, 1790); id. at 376 (Feb. 3, 1790).
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clause as coinciding with the expansive protection of religious belief
and practice recorded in Penn's Charter of Privileges.'
TM
The 1790 Constitution also eliminated the requirement that legis-
lators taking office swear an oath acknowledging "the Scriptures of
the Old and New Testaments to be given by Divine inspiration.,' 5 In-
stead, the 1790 Constitution required judicial, executive and legisla-
tive officers to "be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support the Con-
stitution of this commonwealth, and to perform the duties of their
respective offices with fidelity.', 3 6 This change further sheltered mi-
nority faiths by extending the right to hold office to Jews and other
non-Christians.
The rights engraved in the 1790 Constitution were not to be read-
ily trammeled by competing governmental interests. The delegates
were presented with a proposal specifying that the individual rights
set forth in the constitution are "excepted out of the general powers
of legislation, and shall for ever remain inviolate." The delegates ap-
proved and adopted an amendment that more stringently placed the
rights beyond the power not only of the legislative branch, but of any
arm of government.
3. 1838 and 1874 Constitutions
No alterations to the religious liberty provisions were made in the
1838 Constitution. 9 The next constitutional convention was held in
1872. The Act of Assembly calling this meeting stated specifically that
'm See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 113, at 270-71 (Aug. 21, 1790). The memorial, however,
was critical of the separate constitutional provision maintaining the requirement of the 1776
Constitution that those exempted from military service based upon conscientious objection pay
the equivalent for personal services. While rejecting a proposal that would have eliminated all
reference to exemption of those holding a conscientious objection to bearing arms, see id. at
225 (Feb. 23, 1790), the delegates refused to consider removal of the condition that persons so
exempted pay an equivalent for personal service, id. at 274 (Aug. 23, 1790). The constitution as
adopted preserved both the conscientious objection as well as the condition that persons ex-
empted offer payment as a substitute for military service. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. VI, § 2.
'PA. CONST. of 1776, FRAME OF GOVERNMENT, § 10; Alexander, supra note 39, at 323.
"'PA. CONST. of 1790, art. VIII.
',' CURRY, supra note 19, at 161. The 1790 Constitution omitted the preamble that opened
the 1776 Constitution. The substance of section 45 of the 1776 Constitution was re-codified as
article VII, section 3, and provided: "The rights, privileges, immunities and estates of religious
societies and corporate bodies shall remain as if the constitution of this state had not been al-
tered or amended." PA. CONST. of 1790, art. VII, § 3.
"' See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 113, at 226 (Feb. 23, 1790); PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, §
26 ("To guard against the transgressions of the high powers which we have delegated, we de-
clare, that everything in this article is excepted out of the general powers of government, and
shall forever remain inviolate.").
"9 "The chief issues debated were the governor's power of appointment, tenure of office,
method of choice ofjudges, the voting franchise, public education, and banking and corporate
charters." BRANNING, supra note 106, at 23. That constitution was amended four times, with
none of the amendments related to religion. See HISTORY OF PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 104, at 9-10.
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[N]othing herein contained shall authorize the said Convention to
change the language or to alter in any manner the several provisions of
the ninth article of the present Constitution, commonly known as the
Declaration of Rights, but the same shall be excepted from the powers
given to said Convention, and shall be and remain inviolate forever. 14
While the Convention did not consider this language to bind them, a
proposal to change the Declaration of Rights was strongly opposed.
The Bill of Rights, as we have it, was framed in 1790. It passed
through the Convention of 1837-38 without the alteration of a single
word, without the crossing of a t or the dotting of an i We have had it as
it came from the hands of the Convention in this city, signed as it was,
and proclaimed here on the second day of September, 1790. It is our
magna charter and every principle in it that is worth a farthing is taken
from Magna Charter itself, as was the Declaration of Rights appended to
the Constitution of 1776, and that Declaration of Rights of this Com-
monwealth, as proclaimed in this city in 1790, has been the model upon
that subject for every State government in the United States.
There is not a Constitution in the Union that has a Declaration of
Rights appended thereto, perhaps with the exception of Massachusetts,
that has not some article or some principle in it, taken from that Declara-
tion of Rights of the State of Pennsylvania. It is one of the most perfect
articles in any Constitution in the Union. It cannot be bettered; and
therefore, upon principle, I am opposed to changing it.
I am opposed to changing it in the first place, because I think this
Convention has no power to alter or change or modify it; and I am op-
posed in the second place to changing it because I think it ought not to
be altered, changed or amended. It is better than anything we can make
now, No alteration that this Convention can make, nothing that we can
insert in that article of the Constitution, can improve it in a solitary par-
ticular.
41
The Committee on the Declaration of Rights "made but very few
changes, and those of a rather unimportant character.",4 2 The Com-
mittee returned the Declaration of Rights to the first article of the
constitution, having found that thirty-two other state constitutions so
situated their Bill of Rights.13 While renumbered as article I, section
3, no changes were made to the core religious freedom term."M De-
"' AcT OF ASSEMBLY OF 1873, SECTION 4, reported in 4 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF
1873, at 649 (May 21, 1873) (Harrisburg, Singerly 1873) [hereinafter DEBATES OF THE
CONVENTION]. "The Pennsylvania constitution of 1874... was crafted in an atmosphere of ex-
treme distrust of the legislative body and of fear of the growing power of corporations, espe-
cially of the great railroad corporations .... Legislative reform was truly the dominant motive
of the convention .... " BRANNING, supra note 104, at 37. See also HISTORY OF PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 104, at 10-22.
.. 4 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 140, at 659 (Remarks of Mr. Kaine, May 21,
1873).
"2 Id. at 646 (Remarks of Mr. MacConnell, May 21, 1873); see also HISTORY OF
PENNSYLVANIA CONSTTrIrlONS, supra note 104, at 21 ("[Mlost of the Bill of Rights was carried
over verbatim from the 1838 statement of fundamental rights.")
" 4 DEBATES OFTHE CONVENTION, supra note 140, at 647 (May 21, 1873).
Id. at 669 (May 21, 1873).
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bates over related provisions, however, reaffirmed the Framers'
commitment to the widest religious liberty for members of minority
and majority faiths alike.
Perhaps the clearest endorsement of copious religious liberty for
followers of non-mainstream faiths arose out of the seemingly modest
proposal to amend Article IX, Section 4 of the 1838 Constitution.
That article provided: "No person who acknowledges the being of a
God and a future state of rewards and punishments, shall, on account
of his religion, be disqualified to hold any office or place of profit or
trust under this Commonwealth." The Declaration of Rights Com-
mittee moved that this provision, now numbered as article I, section 4
be amended to delete the word "a" before the word "God.", 4s The
change was tendered because, "taken as it was in the old Constitution,
it might refer to Juggernaut just as well as to almighty God.' 46 Speak-
ing in opposition to the amendment, Mr. Broomall argued 4 7 that the
Founders intended to afford unsparing rights of religious liberty to
unpopular faiths:
The object of our forefathers was not to require any man to adopt any
particular creed; but they did require that he should, to be qualified for
places of trust, so far acknowledge as the binding force of a higher law
upon him as to believe in an overruling Providence. That I may believe
in the particular God of the majority of the people here is no reason why
I should impose upon those who do not believe in Him any necessity to
adopt my creed. We have just passed a section in which it is said that no
human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the
rights of conscience. Now, if it is meant by this to put any disability upon
those whose consciences do not shape their themselves exactly with ours,
if it is proposed by this to offer any inducement to men to shape their
consciences just like our own and so make hypocrites of them, then the
amendment I have offered [to restore the word a] should not be
adopted; but I think our forefathers were right in so guarding this section
as not to contradict the one immediately preceding it.
... I want conscience to be as free as the air. I want nobody to say to me:
"You do not believe in my God; therefore you are not to be entrusted
with the right of talking before a jury or holding any office of trust or
profit."'48
Following Mr. Broomall's speech, the Convention then approved his
amendment to return the word "a" before the word "God" in the arti-
cle. 1
49
1 Id.
Id. at 669 (Remarks of Mr. MacConnell, May 21, 1873).
117 While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court generally has found the statements of individual
convention delegates not relevant in interpreting the constitution, it has at times used the re-
marks of delegates to support its construction. See cases collected in WOODSIDE, supra note 15,
at 63-66.
"' 4 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 140, at 669-70 (Remarks of Mr. Broomall,
May 21, 1873).
"9 Id. at 670 (May 21, 1873). The Convention, however, later rejected proposed amend-
ments to delete the words "and a future state of rewards and punishments" from the article and
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Respect for minority creeds and the primacy of religion over the
civil order also is manifested in debates on the preamble to the 1874
Constitution. As adopted, the preamble reads: "WE, the People of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, grateful to Almighty God for the
blessings of civil and religious liberty, and humbly invoking His guid-
ance, do ordain and establish this Constitution." 50 Rising in opposi-
tion to the preamble, Mr. Broomall, echoing Penn's original vision,
proffered that religious obligations may compel individuals not to ac-
cede to a civil law and that a vote of a majority could not hinder this
pre-eminent duty:
Let us bear in mind that we are proposing not to change the Consti-
tution ourselves, but to submit certain propositions to the people for
their adoption or rejection. Are gentlemen willing to submit to a major-
ity of ballots the question of the existence and attributes of the Deity? I
am not. What a question it is! The being and attributes of the Creator;
the existence of a law-giver above all legislators, of a law above all human
laws, a law that sets aside all human laws when they conflict with it; a law
that binds the individual, not as a member of society, but as a man, and
that commands him not to obey the civil law when it conflicts with this
higher law. We propose to submit to a majority of ballots these great
questions, whether there is a Ruler of the Universe, and whether we are
responsible for our conduct to that Ruler of the Universe! 5
Mr. Patterson agreed that religious obligation occupied a higher or-
der than civil law, but argued that the preamble was not an effort to
elevate the status of any single belief system:
[T]he recognition of God as contained in... the preamble as reported by
the committee, is not a recognition of any religion under heaven specifi-
cally. It is simply an acknowledgment on the part of the people of Pennsyl-
vania of the existence of God Almighty. It is not a question as to whether
God shall be voted up or voted down by the people of Pennsylvania. It is
simply a question of the welfare of our State, as to whether, as a conserva-
tive measure, in order to check, in some degree, the tendency to corrup-
tion and the prevalent irreligion of the day, the substantial portion of the
people of Pennsylvania shall acknowledge this as a bulwark to which they
shall cling, whether they shall put into their Constitution this tribute to the
to eliminate "and who acknowledges the being of a God and a future state of rewards and pun-
ishments" from the section. 5 DEBATES OFTHE CONVENTION, supra note 140, at 561-65 (June 16,
1873); 7 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 140, at 253-55 (Sept. 25, 1873). The motion
to delete this language was made in order to ensure that certain religious sects--principally
Universalists--would not be precluded from holding office. 5 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION,
supra note 140, at 561-62 (Remarks of Mr. Broomall, June 16, 1873). In response, Mr. Black
offered that "a construction has been given to this language by the Supreme Court which does
not exclude the Universalists nor any other class of men who profess to believe in the existence
of a Supreme Divine Governor of the Universe, and believe in any kind of punishment for do-
ing wrong, either in this world or in the next." Id at 562 (Remarks of Mr. J.S. Black). Support-
ers of the amendment then conceded that the legislature had never denied anyone the right to
take office on account of religious belief. Id at 564 (Remarks of Mr. Broomall).
.. PA. CONST. of 1874, pmbl.
"' 4 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 140, at 760 (Remarks of Mr. Broomall, May
23, 1873).
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power which is behind the State and above the State and which all the
States in this country, so far, have recognized their faith ....
I ask delegates sincerely and honestly to look at this question and vote con-
scientiously, as they ought, on the question of the recognition of God,
without regard to any particular religion, and remembering that such a
recognition is not a step towards the recognition of any State religion .... 1 2
Approval of the preamble thus represented reaffirmation of the im-
portance of religion and religious liberty in general, but without any
preference for, or discrimination against, particular sects.
Perhaps the strongest evidence of the delegates' respect for mi-
nority faiths is evidenced by the treatment of religious exemptions
from military service. Like its 1776 and 1790 predecessors, the 1838
Constitution provided that "[t]hose who conscientiously scruple to
bear arms shall not be compelled to do so, but shall pay an equivalent
for personal service., 5 3 Followers of the Quaker faith petitioned the
1873 convention to eliminate the "military tax" that the constitution
imposed as a condition to exemption. While the Quakers did not ob-
ject to general taxation, even though portions would be used to sup-
port the military, the payment of a fine as a quid pro quo for being
granted a religious exemption from military service was offensive to
their conscience.
5 4
The Committee on the Militia proposed a new article that elimi-
nated both reference to conscientious objection as well as payment of
an equivalent amount for personal service. 155 In the Committee's
view, abrogating the earlier provisions afforded the legislature the
power to excuse objectors from military service without conditioning
exemption on payment of a fine or tax. Mr. Carter proposed an
amendment that added the following language to the Committee's
proposal: "But the Legislature may exempt from military service
members of religious societies who have conscientious scruples
against bearing arms.' 5 6 Unlike the Committee proposal, Carter's
amendment explicitly empowered the legislature to release conscien-
tious objectors from military obligations; unlike the prior constitu-
tions, it did not mandate payment of the monetary equivalent of per-
sonal service by those exempted.
The fate of proposed adjustments to Mr. Carter's amendment il-
luminates the delegates' regard for minority religious liberty. The
delegates rejected amendments that would have restored the re-
Id. at 767 (Remarks of Mr. T.H.B. Patterson, May 23, 1873).
PA. CONST. of 1838, art. VI, § 2.
3 DEBATES OFTHE CONVENTION, supra note 140, at 160, 170 (Mar. 26, 1873).
The proposal read: "The freemen of this Commonwealth shall be armed, organized
and disciplined for its defence, when and in such manner as may be directed by law; the Legis-
lature shall provide for maintaining the militia by direct appropriation from the State Treas-
ury." 3 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 140, at 159 (Mar. 26, 1873).
"5 3 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 140, at 161 (Mar. 26, 1873); PA. CONST. of
1874, art. IX.
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quirement that one exempted must pay an equivalent for personal
services' 57 as well as an amendment that would have denied the right
to vote in any state or municipal election to anyone claiming a relig-
ious objection to military service15s Equally importantly, the dele-
gates accepted an amendment to extend the exemption beyond
members of religious societies to any person-whether or not part of
an organized religion-who has conscientious scruples against bear-
ing arms.1
59
The statements of supporters of the religious exemption from
service make clear that not only in this constitution, but from Penn's
founding of the colony, the utmost protection was to extend to relig-
ious belief, including sentiments not shared by the majority. Mr. Car-
ter, who proposed the original amendment restoring reference to
exemption from military service, offered:
I do not consider it at all necessary for the consideration of my amend-
ment, nor to commend its adoption... that we shall enter into any dis-
cussion as to whether those religious sects, holding the opinions that I re-
fer to, are right or wrong in that matter... W] e cannot refuse to
recognize honest conscientious scruples. They are something that no
man can fail to respect....
[I]f it be not essential to the guaranteeing of the rights of conscience to
those few religionists who hold this view, we owe it to ourselves, meeting
here under the shadow of that August presence [pointing to the portrait
of William Penn over the President's desk,] and within the limits of this
city of brotherly love, founded by him and that very sect, which sect has
even yet a moral influence in this State far superior to its relative num-
bers ....
When William Penn founded the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania he
said: "I am founding a colony for all mankind." This great principle of
perfect religious toleration, which he always observed, constituted one of
the main elements of his greatness, and the society which he founded,
and of which he was a most eminent teacher, has always observed with
scrupulous care this right....
A man has to rise to a high pitch of enlightenment, and to attain to a
sublime Christian elevation of thought, before he will acknowledge that
others shall have all the rights to which their conscientious beliefs entitle
them, and before he will admit, fully and without reserve, the right of
others to conscientiously differ from him. This principle has in all times,
since the inauguration of christianity, been settled, and the conviction
,' 3 DEBATES OF THE CONvENTION, supra note 140, at 175-76 (Mar. 26, 1873). The dele-
gates rejected a second proposal to restore the "military tax" offered on behalf of German Bap-
tists who felt that they owed government something in return for the protection provided by
government. 7 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 140, at 575-95 (Oct. 7-8, 1873). Mr.
M'Clean argued unsuccessfully that the payment requirement should not be eliminated at the
behest of the Quakers. Id. at 575 (Remarks of Mr. M'Clean, Oct. 7, 1873).
.. 3 DEBATES OFTHE CONVENTION, Supra note 140, at 177 (Mar. 26, 1873).
... Id. at 176-77.
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has grown with the growth of civilization that concessions should be
made to the right of conscience.'6°
Mr. Darlington, speaking generally about the tension between the
state's interest in security and individual religious belief, articulated a
standard that foreshadows the compelling interest test:
I suppose that we all would agree that our conscientious scruples upon
matters of religion and faith are sacred, and must never be touched by
the government. In other words, that no number of men can or ought to
interfere with my conscientious convictions, unless it becomes a matter of
State necessity that those convictions should be disregarded ....
The conscientious scruples of every individual should be observed unless
the public safety requires that they should be disregarded. And that the
public safety does not require that the, should be disregarded has been
shown by the past history of the State.
The 1873 Convention was the last one in which the entire Penn-
sylvania Constitution was examined and readopted. The 1967 Con-
vention, limited to considering specific articles of the constitution,
made no substantive changes to the religious freedom provision of
the constitution. Thus the religious liberty provisions of the present
constitution may be plainly traced to the text of the 1776 Constitu-
tion, with the modest changes in the 1790 and 1874 Constitutions
serving to strengthen its guarantees of religious liberty.
Several conclusions may be gleaned from the constitutional his-
tory. At the most elementary level, the fact that the religious liberty
protection of article I, section 3 has its genesis in the Constitution of
1776 bolsters the position that this provision is to be interpreted in-
dependent of the Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion. Obviously the Framers of the 1776 Constitution could not and
did not clone the religion clause from the text of the First Amend-
ment of the federal Bill of Rights, which was not adopted until fifteen
years later. 62 Second, the fact that the terms of the present article I,
section 3 have remained relatively unchanged since 1776 manifests
the importance of religious liberty in the Commonwealth. As the
11 Id. at 161-62 (Remarks of Mr. Carter, Mar. 26, 1873).
1 Id. at 166-67 (Remarks of Mr. Darlington). To the same effect are the supporting re-
marks of Mr. Curtin: "[I]f there be a body of men in Pennsylvania who have conscientious
scruples and the State will not suffer, then this Convention should not impose duties upon
them which they cannot perform without a violation of religious belief, of Christian duty and
obligation." Id. at 171 (Remarks of Mr. Curtin).
'6 Thus, contrary to the popular misconception that state constitutions are somehow pat-
terned after the United States Constitution, the reverse is true." Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 896. See
also Robert F. Williams, A "Row of Shadows":. Pennsylvania's Misguided Lockstep Approach to Its State
Constitutional Equality Doctrine, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 343, 346 (1993) (Arguing that because
equality clauses of the Pennsylvania Constitution are precedent to, and not modeled after Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, state constitution should not be interpreted
in "lockstep" with federal Equal Protection Clause); Donald Marritz, Making Equality Matter
(Again): The Prohibition Against Special Laws in the Pennsylvania Constitution, 3 WIDENERJ. PUB. L.
161, 195 (1993) ("This history and purpose of the special laws provision [of the Pennsylvania
Constitution] have little in common with those of the Fourteenth Amendment....").
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in construing the search and sei-
zure provisions of the state constitution more broadly than the
Fourth Amendment, "the survival of the language now employed in
article I, section 8 through over 200 years of profound change in
other areas demonstrates that the paramount concern for privacy first
adopted as part of our organic law in 1776 continues to enjoy the
mandate of the people of this Commonwealth.' 63 Perhaps no provi-
sion of the state or constitution has proven more durable than the
sanctity of religious liberty of minority faiths-a veneration that
would be significantly undermined were the majority permitted to
burden religious liberty on a bare showing of rational basis. Third,
the constitutional history of the religious liberty clauses of the current
constitution echoes William Penn's conception of religious liberty
perpetuated in the colonial charters. The individual's obligation to
his creator-whether or not shared by the majority-is precedent and
superior to his duties to the civil society. Hence, no human authority
is empowered to purposefully control or in effect interfere with the
right of conscience, even-as the conscientious objector exemption
makes clear-where the security of the state is at stake. History con-
firms the interpretation afforded by the plain meaning of the text of
article I, section -- that rules of general applicability may constitu-
tionally interfere with one's religious exercise only where government
proves it has a compelling interest not attainable by means less re-
strictive of that religious practice.
Ell. PENNSYLVANIA CASE-LAW SUPPORTS THE HISTORIC EVIDENCE
THAT THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION PROTECTS
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY INDEPENDENT OF, AND MORE WIDELY THAN,
THE CURRENT INTERPRETATION OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
The Edmunds Court required consideration of Pennsylvania case-
law as part of the assessment of the history of the constitutional provi-
sion in issue. Court decisions interpreting Article I, Section 3 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution are entirely consistent with its colonial and
constitutional history. Long before the First Amendment was applied
to the states, the Pennsylvania courts applied independent constitu-
tional scrutiny under article I, section 3 that presaged the compelling
interest test.
A. Debunking the Myths ofWiest and Springfield School District
Before analyzing the true historic jurisprudence of article I, sec-
tion 3, it is necessary to dissect two cases, Wiest v. Mt. Lebanon School
Distric and Springfield School District v. Department of Educa-
Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457,467 (Pa. 1983).
320 A.2d 362 (Pa. 1974).
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tion,'which suggest that the Article I, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution is to be interpreted in lockstep with the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment. Wiest arose out of a fact situation
that smacks principally of Establishment Clause jurisprudence-a suit
to restrain the School District from including an invocation and
benediction at high school graduation ceremonies. In addition to
challenging the invocation and benediction as offensive to the Estab-
lishment Clause of the United States Constitution, however, plaintiffs
founded their claim for relief on the Free Exercise Clause of the
United States Constitution as well as upon Article I, Section 3 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first held that the School Dis-
trict did not contravene the Free Exercise Clause of the United States
Constitution. The court properly observed that the guarantees of the
Free Exercise Clause are triggered only where the plaintiff initially
proves that the government has somehow restrained his religious lib-
erty. Because attendance at commencement activities was voluntary
and those who did not attend could gather their diplomas at the
principal's office, the invocation and benediction did not exert any
coercive effect on the practice of the plaintiffs' religion.
166
The fact that participation in graduation ceremonies was volun-
tary did not similarly settle the federal Establishment Clause issue.
The court concluded, however, that plaintiffs had not presented suf-
ficient facts to satisfy their burden of persuasion that the purpose or
principal effect of the District's resolution endorsing an invocation
and benediction was to promote religion.
167
Having found no invasion of either religion clause of the federal
Constitution, the court turned to plaintiffs' averment that the invoca-
tion and benediction violated Article I, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. In order to comprehend the Wiest court's disposition of
this issue, it is essential to set forth the text of the court's analysis in
full:
The principles enunciated in [article I, section 3] of our Constitution re-
flected a concern for the protection of the religious freedoms of Pennsyl-
vanians long before the First Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion was made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Provisions identical to the above section [of the Pennsylva-
nia Constitution of 1874] were contained in the constitutions of 1790
and 1838 and a similar provision was contained in the constitution of
1776. On the authority of this provision, this Court has prohibited the
use of a public schoolroom for Catholic religious instruction after hours
and the use of public school property for sectarian religious purposes
when school was not in session. The protection of rights and freedoms secured
by this section of our Constitution, however, does not transcend the protection of
397 A.2d 1154 (Pa. 1979).
Wiest, 320 A.2d at 364-65.
Id. at 365-66.
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the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Our prior discussion is,
therefore, equally apposite to this issue. Furthermore, we do not feel
that an invocation and benediction are the type of activity at which this
section of our Constitution was aimed. This claim, therefore, was also
properly dismissed by the court below.Iss
There are several reasons why the court's one paragraph analysis
in Wiest does not resolve whether like the First Amendment, the
Pennsylvania Constitution requires the government to demonstrate
only a rational basis, rather than a compelling interest and no less re-
strictive alternative, to sustain rules of general applicability that bur-
den religion. First, although not entirely free from doubt, the court's
state constitutional analysis appears to address the Establishment
rather than the Free Exercise component of article I, section 3. The
only cases the court cited in its assessment of the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution-Hysong and Bender-concern use of school property for relig-
ious purposes. 69 Nowhere did the court analogize, cite, or otherwise
allude to any freedom of conscience cases decided by the Pennsylva-
nia courts. Any holding that the state constitution does not impose
stricter limits on the establishment of religion than does the United
States Constitution would not in turn mandate that the free exercise
dimensions of the two constitutions are to be interpreted in lockstep.
Second, even if the court's opinion can somehow be contorted to
address the Free Exercise protections of article I, section 3, the Wiest
court did not have occasion to determine the appropriate level of
scrutiny of laws of general applicability that interfere with the free
exercise of religion. The only "prior discussion"70 of the federal Free
Exercise Clause that the court could deem "equally apposite "1 to its
analysis of the Pennsylvania Constitution is the court's earlier reason-
ing that because attendance at commencement was voluntary, the
School District did not exert any coercive effect on the plaintiff's re-
ligious liberty. As the government had placed no burden on the
plaintiff's faith, the court was not confronted with assessing whether
the interest proffered by the School District rose to a level sufficient
to justify the incursion. The Wiest court was neither presented with
nor decided the question of whether under the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution, government must prove a compelling interest, or merely a ra-
tional basis, to sustain rules of general applicability that burden the
free exercise of an individual's religion.
7
1
,"Wiest v. Mt. Lebanon Sch. Dist., 320 A.2d 362,366-67 (Pa. 1974) (emphasis added).
Hysong v. Gallitzin Borough Sch. Dist., 30 A. 482, 482-84 (Pa. 1894); Bender v. Stre-
abich, 37 A. 853 (1897). Hysong also addressed the separate issue of whether members of the
Order of St. Joseph, a religious society of the Roman Catholic Church, could be employed to
teach in the public schools.
,- Wes, 320 A.2d at 367.
171 Id.
'" Had the Wiest Court reached out in dictum to comment on the appropriate level of
scrutiny, it necessarily would have endorsed strict scrutiny for all burdens on religion whether
intended or inadvertent. At the time of the Vwst opinion, the United States Supreme Court was
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Five years later, the Supreme Court in Springfield School District v.
Department of Education17 3 again declined to find greater protection
under article I, section 3 than under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The case arose out of a challenge to the
constitutionality of the portion of the Public School Code that forced
local school districts to provide free transportation to students of
non-public schools. Three school districts argued that supplying free
transportation to parochial students violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that the Act did not transgress the federal Establishment Clause.
The court then observed that article I, section 3 of the state constitu-
tion does not impose stricter limits on the separation of church and
state than the Establishment Clause limits of the United States Con-
stitution. The Court's reasoning in Springfield essentially is comprised
of quoting the Court's one paragraph analysis in Wiest.
Like Wiest, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Spring-
field School District does not answer whether Article I, Section 3 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution affords broader guarantees of religious
freedom than the proscriptions of the Free Exercise Clause of the
United States Constitution. Plaintiffs in Springfield lodged no claim
whatsoever under the Free Exercise Clause of the United States Con-
stitution. Accordingly, the court was not faced with the issue of the
appropriate standard that government must meet under article I, sec-
tion 3 to justify incursions on free exercise of religion.
In short, rudimentary case analysis betrays that neither Wiest nor
Springfield School District holds that the Pennsylvania Constitution must
be interpreted to mirror the United States Constitution in repudiat-
ing the compelling interest test for burdens on religious liberty vis-
ited by across the board laws.'74 Notably, neither case assessed the
four factors later prescribed by Edmunds. Indeed, the Superior Court
in Wikoski v. Wikoski dismissed as "only dicta" the Wiest court's state-
applying the compelling interest/least restrictive alternative test set forth in Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972), to all burdens on free exercise-both those intended and those imposed
by rules of general applicability. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Thus, unless the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was to take the unprecedented step of declaring religious liberty
an absolute right, see Andress v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Philadelphia, 188 A.2d 709, 712
(Pa. 1963) ("The Constitutionally ordained right of ... freedom of religion... [is] not abso-
lute."), there was no reason to find that the Pennsylvania Constitution demanded a higher de-
gree of governmental justification to sustain burdens on religious liberty than the extant strict
scrutiny exacted by the United States Constitution. The Wiest Court certainly would not and
could not have held that unintended burdens on religious liberty were justifiable under the
Pennsylvania Constitution whenever the government has a rational basis. Given that strict scru-
tiny was demanded by the federal Constitution, to have endorsed rational basis review under
that state constitution would have contravened the Supremacy Clause of the United States Con-
stitution. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
'"397 A.2d 1154 (Pa. 1979).
l74 See also Bruce Ledewitz, Could the Death Penalty Be a Cruel Punishment, 3 WIDENERJ. PUB.
L. 121, 138-39 (1993) ("As part of the new federalism, the legal community is coming to appre-
ciate the valid, independent role of state judges in interpreting state constitutions... [A] coex-
tensive approach to a state constitution is a poor method of constitutional interpretation.").
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ment that the protections of article I, section 3 do not exceed the
guarantees of the Free Exercise Clause.175
Any intimation that article I section 3 must be interpreted in
lockstep with the federal Constitution is refuted by a line of cases, de-
cided long before the First Amendment was held applicable to the
states, in which the Pennsylvania courts evaluated under the state
constitution challenges to general laws invading an individual's relig-
ious liberty. The scrutiny applied by the Pennsylvania courts con-
forms more to the demanding compelling interest test than the en-
tirely deferential rational basis standard.
B. The Pennsylvania Courts Scrutinized Laws Invading Religious Liberty
Before the First Amendment Was Made Applicable to the States
The constitutional history of article I, section 3 unequivocally
demonstrates that the precursors to the article were precedent in
time to, and not modeled after, the Free Exercise Clause of the fed-
eral Constitution. Similarly, the Pennsylvania courts had evaluated
challenges to laws of general applicability under article I, section 3
long before 1940, when the Free Exercise Clause was first held appli-
cable to the States. 176 This settled independent jurisprudence repudi-
ates any suggestion that the Pennsylvania courts have interpreted ar-
ticle I, section 3 merely to duplicate protection afforded by the
"5 513 A.2d 986, 988 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (noting that state constitutional provisions
may expand upon federal protections).
" See City of Pittsburgh v. Ruffiner, 4 A.2d 224 (Pa. 1939); Commonwealth v. Herr, 78 A. 68
(Pa. 1910); Hysong v. Sch. Dist. of Gallitzin Borough, 30 A. 482 (1894); Philips v. Gratz, 2 Pen.
& W. 410 (Pa. 1831); Commonwealth v. Lesher, 17 Serg. & Rawle 155 (Pa. 1828); Updegraph v.
Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824); Commonwealth v. Wolf, 3 Serg. & Rawle 48
(Pa. 1817); Halperin v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 81 Pa. Super. 591 (1923); City of Wilkes-Barre v.
Garabed, 11 Pa. Super. 355 (1899).
There have been other Pennsylvania cases concerned with religion and religious freedom
that are not of importance in analysis of article I, section 3. Some cases mentioned Article I,
Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, but based their holdings solely on the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution. See In re Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114, 1118 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 1989); Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 497 A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). Other cases
were based solely on the First Amendment without even a passing reference to article I, section
3. See In re Green, 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1972); Fitzgerald v. City of Philadelphia, 102 A.2d 887 (Pa.
1954); Fink v. Bd. of Educ., 442 A.2d 837 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982); Appeal of the Open Door
Baptist Church, 437 A.2d 1291 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981); Christian Sch. Ass'n of Greater Harris-
burg v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 423 A.2d 1340 (Pa. Commw. Ct 1980). Several other cases
raising religious arguments are not applicable because they were decided on other grounds. See
In re First Church of Christ Scientist, 55 A. 536 (Pa. 1903) (holding based on Pennsylvania's in-
corporation laws and whether the incorporation of the organization would endanger the pub-
lic). Also, the case of Zook v. State Board ofDentistry, 683 A.2d 713 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996), is not
helpful in determining whether article I, section 3 requires the use of the compelling interest
test or rational basis test. In Zook, a post-Smith case, the defendant argued that the First
Amendment still required a generally applicable law to be analyzed using the compelling inter-
est test. However, the Commonwealth Court never had to decide the case on the merits be-
cause the court determined that there had been no burden on the defendant's religious exer-
cises.
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federal Constitution. Indeed, even after the religion clauses of the
First Amendment were held to govern the states, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court acknowledged that "this amendment is not nearly as
stringent as the corresponding provision in the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution."
177
C. The Pennsylvania Courts Have Evaluated General Laws that
Burden Religion Under Standards More Akin to the
Compelling Interest Test than to the Rational Basis Test
The United States Supreme Court first specifically articulated the
compelling interest test for Free Exercise cases in Sherbert v. Verner.' 78
It is not surprising that the pre-1963 Pennsylvania cases under article
I, section 3 do not employ either the phrase "compelling interest" or
"rational basis" in their assessing the constitutionality of laws of gen-
eral applicability that burden religion. Rather than reflexively up-
holding all general laws that conflict with an individual's faith, how-
ever, the Pennsylvania courts invariably insisted upon proof of a
substantial overriding governmental interest before subordinating re-
ligion to the demands of the civil order. Thus Pennsylvania jurispru-
dence is commensurate with the history of article I, section 3 in de-
manding a compelling interest, rather than a rational basis, before
government may constrain an individual's religious exercise through
neutral laws.
Most of the Pennsylvania cases sustaining general laws challenged
under the religious freedom provisions of the state constitution in-
voke the one overriding interest that William Penn accepted must
qualify religious liberty-the rights holder must live "peaceably" in
civil society.' 79 In Updegraph v. Commonwealth,8 the court affirmed the
blasphemy conviction of a member of a debating society who argued
that the Holy Scriptures were a fable; the court reasoned that defen-
dant's words were not part of a serious intellectual debate but instead
were an insult that tended to "disturb the public peace..' 8' While un-
doubtedly violative of modem day Establishment Clause8 2 and free
1 Commonwealth v. Bauder, 145 A.2d 915,917 (Pa. Super. CL 1958).
'7 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
'- See The Laws Agreed Upon in England pt. XXXV (1682), reprinted in A COLLECTION OF
CHARTERS AND OTHER PUBLICK ACTS RELATING TO THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA, sUpra note
91, at 17 (Philadelphia, Franklin 1740) ("obliged in Conscience to live peaceably and justly in
civil Society"); The Great Law, ch. 1 (1682), reprinted in CHARTER TO WILLIAM PENN AND LAWS OF
THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA PASSED BETWEEN THE YEARS 1682 AND 1700, supra note 94, at
108 ("Obliged in Conscience to Live peaceably and quietly under civill government"); Charter of
PriviLeges (1701), reprinted in 4 THE PAPERS OF PENN, supra note 73, at 106 ("Obliged to live qui-
etly under the Civill Governement").
11 Serg. & Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824).
181 Id. at 399.
' The Court's analysis was premised upon the supposition that Christianity was part of the
common law of Pennsylvania. Id at 399-404.
[Vol. 4:1
CODA TO WILUAM PENN'S OVERTURE
speech jurisprudence, the court in 1824 deemed the blasphemy law
to serve a vital state interest in preserving public order:
It is open, public vilification of the religion of the country that is pun-
ished, not to force conscience by punishment, but to preserve the peace
of the country by an outward respect to the religion of the country, and
not as a restraint upon the liberty of conscience; but licentiousness, en-
dangering the public peace, when tending to corrupt society, is consid-
ered a breach of the peace .... 3
The court did not consider the state interest in quelling breaches of
the peace to be minimal; to the contrary, in the court's mind "[t]o
prohibit the open, public and explicit denial of the popular religion
of a country, is a necessary measure to preserve the tranquility of a
government.' 8 4 Subsequent cases upheld laws designed to prevent
disturbances caused by the playing of musical instruments on the
street,' hawking merchandise to houses and businesses, and at-
tempting to force entry into private homes, against religious chal-
lenge."' 7 Conversely, the Commonwealth's supreme court held the
Pennsylvania Constitution safeguarded the right to attempt to con-
vert members of the Roman Catholic faith where there was no evi-
dence that those engaged in efforts to convert had caused any "un-
rest" in the past or would "breach the peace" or offend "good
order."'8'
Cases upholding the constitutionality of Sunday Closing Laws also
employed a standard of scrutiny comparable to the compelling inter-
est/least restrictive alternative test. In Commonwealth v. Wolf,8 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned that it was "of the utmost
moment" that members of the community abide by a day of rest "to
invigorate their bodies for fresh exertions of activity." The court in
Id. at 408.
id -L at 405.
'"See City of Wilkes-Barre v. Garabed, 11 Pa. Super. 355, 366 (1899) (holding nuisance law
that made the playing of a musical instrument on the streets illegal without a permit did not
violate religious freedom of Salvation Army members under Pennsylvania Constitution: "no
one can lawfully stretch his own liberty of action so as to interfere with that of his neighbors or
violate the peace and good order").
' See City of Pittsburgh v. Ruffner, 4 A.2d 224, 227 (Pa. 1939) (holding ordinance requir-
ing permit to peddle merchandise did not violate rights ofJehovah's Witnesses under state con-
stitution where ordinance was "designed to protect people in their homes and offices from be-
ing victimized by unscrupulous and unauthorized agents"). The United States Supreme Court
later held such permit requirements violate the United States Constitution. See Follett v.
McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
'.. See Commonwealth v. Palms, 15 A.2d 481, 484 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1940) (holding disorderly
conduct prosecution ofJehovah's Witnesses who made incessant noise and persistent attempts
to enter homes did not violate religious freedom under Pennsylvania Constitution; the mode of
expressing religious belief may not be "inimical to the peace, good order and morals of soci-
ety"). The court further reasoned that defendant violated a constitutional right older than the
right of religious freedom-the right to be secure in one's home from unwanted invasion. I&d
at 485.
'"Application for Charter of Conversion Center, Inc., 130 A.2d 107, 111 (Pa. 1957).
'"3 Serg. & Rawle 48, 51 (Pa. 1817).
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Specht v. Commonwealth'90 similarly found that "[a] 11 agree that to the
well-being of society, periods of rest are absolutely necessary." The Su-
perior Court further recognized that there are no less restrictive al-
ternatives to fixing a single day on which no work is to be done:
To permit a person to rest on his own day of choice would compel the
Commonwealth to prove which was the day of his choice and that he had
not rested on that day or if he had no day of his own choice that he had
worked on each of the other six days of the week. Any such requirement
would practically nullify the law. 191
While the Pennsylvania courts did not use the compelling interest
terminology, they repeatedly stated that only those governmental in-
terests that are "paramount" may constitutionally burden religious
exercise.'92 This term was first expressed in Justice Gibson's dissent-
ing opinion in Commonwealth v. Lesher
It is declared in the constitution [of 1790] that "no human authority can,
in any case, control or interfere with the rights of conscience." But what
are those rights? Simply a right to worship the Supreme Being according
to the dictates of the heart; to adopt any creed or hold any opinion what-
ever on the subject of religion; and to do, or forebear to do, any act, for
conscience sake, the doing or forebearing of which is not prejudicial to the
public weal. But salus populi suprema lex, is a maxim of universal applica-
tion; and where liberty of conscience would impinge upon the para-
mount right of the public, it ought to be restrained.'93
' 8 Pa. 312, 323 (Pa. 1848) (emphasis supplied).
... Commonwealth v. Bauder, 145 A.2d 915, 919 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958). The United States
Supreme Court similarly applied the least restrictive alternative test to Sunday Closing Laws,
challenged under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 607-08 (1961). For a discussion concerning the Supreme Court's interpretation of
Sunday Closing Laws in conjunction with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, see
Martin S. Sheffer, God Versus Caesar: Free Exercise, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and Con-
science, 23 OKLA. CITy U. L. REv. 929, 934-39 (1998).
The Pennsylvania cases upholding Sunday Closing Laws held that the prohibition of work
on Sunday did not violate any tenet of the faith of the person challenging the law. See Specht v.
Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312, 324-26 (1848); Commonwealth v. Wolf, 3 Serg. & Rawle 48, 49-50
(Pa. 1817); Commonwealth v. Bauder, 145 A.2d 915, 918 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958). See also Hal-
perin v. Public Serv. Comm., 81 Pa. Super. 591 (1923) (finding denial of certificate to be com-
mon carrier did not interfere with religious worship ofJewish faith or affect howJewish funeral
ceremonies are conducted).
"2 In Commonwealth v. Herr, 78 A. 68 (Pa. 1910), the court held that a law forbidding teach-
ers in public schools to wear religious garb did not violate the religious freedom clause of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. In the course of its opinion, the court did state that the legislature
has the power to make "reasonable regulations" that may affect teachers. Id. at 73. Nowhere in
its reasoning, however, did the Herr court elect between the "paramount" or "reasonableness"
test for purposes of Article I, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Interestingly, the
court in Wikoski v. Wikoski, 513 A.2d 986, 988 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), while formally adopting the
.paramount" test, cites Herr approvingly for the proposition that the right of conscience is not
absolute.
'" 17 Serg. & Rawle 155, 160 (Pa. 1828) (Gibson,J., dissenting). In Lesher, the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court held that removing ajuror who had a religious objection to imposing the
death penalty did not violate the juror's liberty of conscience under the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion. The court reasoned that the government had an overriding interest in the integrity of the
criminal justice system, which would be compromised by including jurors who had precon-
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The requirement that a government interest be "paramount" in or-
der to trump religious liberty under the state constitution was reiter-
ated in Commonwealth v. Beile 94 and in Wikoski v. Wikoski.19 5 The Wiko-
ski court construed the condition that the government interest be
"paramount" to be a "most substantial test," finding the standard
equivalent to the compelling interest test eventually adopted by the
United States Supreme Court in evaluating claimed invasions under
the Free Exercise Clause.196
Two conclusions follow from examination of Pennsylvania case-
law. First, the religious liberty provision of the state constitution is to
be interpreted independent of the Free Exercise Clause of the
United States Constitution. As the courts properly found the state
constitution to shelter religious freedom for more than 120 years be-
fore the First Amendment was incorporated against the states, article
I, section 3 should not suddenly cease to merit an autonomous con-
struction once the Free Exercise Clause became a meaningful source
of religious liberty. 9' Second, the Pennsylvania courts consistently
ceived notions or who would ignore the evidence and facts. Id. at 156, 159. See also Philips v.
Gratz, 2 Pen. & W. 412, 416 (Pa. 1831) (compelling person to testify on Saturday Sabbath did
not violate state constitution "else a denial of the lawfulness of capital punishment would ex-
empt a witness from testifying to facts that serve to convict a prisoner of murder"); Stansbury v.
Marks, 2 Dall. 213 (Pa. 1793) (holding that court properly fined Jewish witness who refused to
testify on his Sabbath).
.. 79 A.2d 134 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1951). The Beiler court held that the Pennsylvania law man-
dating public school attendance until the age of sixteen did not violate the religious freedom of
the Amish. The court found the state had a "paramount" interest in the education of children
to accomplish the "fundamental objectives" of safety, integrity, independence and progress of
the Commonwealth as well as the preservation and enrichment of democracy. In Wsconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the United States Supreme Court found these interests insufficient
to justify infringing the sincerely held religious beliefs of the Amish.
" 513 A.2d 986 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
' Id. at 989. In Commonwealth v. Eubanks, 512 A-2d 619, 621-23 (Pa. 1986), the court held
that a prosecutor violated article I, section 3 by making "sarcastic commentary" concerning the
defendant's religious beliefs. The court reasoned that religious freedom is a "fundamental"
right, a designation that customarily demands the highest governmental justification when
trammeled. Id. at 622. The Eubanks court also directed the reader to view THE PAPERS OF
WtLtIAM PENN, supra note 73.
"' Even if the Pennsylvania courts had relied upon the United States Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the First Amendment when construing article I, section 3, one commentator has
suggested that the rejection of the compelling interest test in Smith should not necessarily affect
the prior Pennsylvania constitutional precedent. See Bruce Ledewitz, When Federal Law Is Also
State Law: The Implications for State Constitutional Law Methodology of Footnote Seven in Common-
wealth v. Matos, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 561 (1999). According to Professor Ledewitz, if the earlier
state constitutional precedent had reflected dissatisfaction with the compelling interest test,
then a presumption should arise that the Pennsylvania courts would adopt the new federal
standard-the rational basis test-under the Pennsylvania Constitution. See id. at 578. How-
ever, if the prior state constitutional precedent reflected satisfaction and approval of the com-
pelling interest test, a presumption should arise that the Pennsylvania courts would reject the
use of the rational basis test under the Pennsylvania Constitution. See id. Even if the Pennsylva-
nia courts had relied upon the precedent of the United States Supreme Court in interpreting
article I, section 3, the Pennsylvania courts' support of the compelling interest test for decades
before and after Sherbert reflects that the courts should continue to apply the compelling inter-
est test post-Smith under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
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mandated proof of more than a rational basis before upholding laws
of general applicability that conflicted with an individual's religious
convictions. Accordingly, requiring government to prove a compel-
ling interest and no less restrictive alternatives before refusing to ex-
empt a religious objector from an across the board law comports with
the constitutional and jurisprudential history, as well as the text, of
Article I, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
IV. RELATED CASE-LAW FROM OTHER STATES SUPPORTS
APPLICATION OF THE COMPELLING INTEREST TEST UNDER ARTICLE I,
SECTION 3 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION
The Edmunds court urged that litigants also should seek guidance
on interpretation of the Pennsylvania Constitution from related
precedent from other states. The Pennsylvania courts have used this
factor in two different manners. At times, the courts have limited
their discussion of kindred case-law to a mere "scorecard," 98 tallying
the number of state courts favoring competing constructions of the
constitution. More often, the courts have been faithful to the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court's admonition to go beyond a head count and
examine the reasoning used by other state courts.'" Both approaches
support interpreting Article I, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion to require strict scrutiny of laws of general applicability that bur-
den the free exercise of religion.
A. The "Scorecard" of Other States Heavily Favors
the Compelling Interest Test
The overwhelming state law response to the United States Su-
preme Court's diminution of religious freedom under the First
Amendment in Smith has been to demand that government prove a
compelling interest to justify any incursion on religious liberty.
" See Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 738 A.2d 427, 432 (Pa. 1999); Stenger v. Lehigh Valley
Hosp. Ctr., 609 A.2d 796, 803 (Pa. 1992); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 598 A.2d 975, 980 n.10 (Pa.
1991); Commonwealth v. Carroll, 628 A.2d 398, 402-03 nn.3-4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
" See Commonwealth v. Zhahir, 751 A.2d 1153, 1160-61 (Pa. 2000); Commonwealth v. Ar-
royo, 723 A.2d 162, 169 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Waltson, 724 A.2d 289, 292 (Pa. 1998);
Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350, 362-64 (Pa. 1998); Commonwealth v. Williams, 692 A.2d
1031, 1038 (Pa. 1997); Commonwealth v. Hayes, 674 A.2d 677, 681 (Pa. 1996); Commonwealth
v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769, 775 (Pa. 1996); Commonwealth v. Swinehart, 664 A.2d 957, 965-67 (Pa.
1995); UA Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612, 619 (Pa. 1993); Blum v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. 626 A.2d 537, 547-48 (Pa. 1993); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586
A.2d 887, 900-01 (Pa. 1991); Commonwealth v. Crouse, 729 A.2d 588, 597 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999);
Commonwealth v. J.B., 719 A.2d 1058, 1064-66 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); Commonwealth v. Glass,
718 A.2d 804, 809-10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998), affd by Commonwealth v. Glass, 754 A.2d 655 (Pa.
2000); In re B.C., 683 A.2d 919, 928 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); Commonwealth v. Craft, 669 A.2d
394, 395-96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); Commonwealth v. Rosenfelt, 662 A.2d 1131, 1142-44 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 1995).
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Eleven states-Massachusetts, 2 °° New York,20 1 Minnesota,
2 2 Alaska,20 3
Montana,2°4 Wisconsin,205 Washington,206 Ohio2 07 Maine, 208 North Caro-
lina,2°0 and Kansas2 °--have determined that their state constitutions
furnish more protection than the federal Constitution and employ
the compelling interest test to evaluate the constitutionality of relig-
iously neutral laws that burden a person's free exercise of faith.~'
The legislatures of eight additional states-Rhode Island,2 2 Con-
necicut,213 Illinois 21
4 Florida 21 5 South Carolina,
21 ' Arizona 21 7 Texas,21 8
See Soc'y ofJesus of New England v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass.
1990); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994).
"' SeeRourke v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 603 N.Y.S.2d 647 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993), aff'd
by 615 N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
See State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).
SeeSwannerv. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994).
See Davis v. Church ofJesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 852 P.2d 640 (Mont. 1993); St.
John's Lutheran Church v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 830 P.2d 1271 (Mont. 1992).
See State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235 (Wis. 1996).
2" SeeFirst Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992).
See Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (Ohio 2000); State v. Bontranger, 683 N.E.2d
126 (Ohio App. Ct. 1996).
See Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992).
SeeIn reBrowning, 476 S.E.2d 465 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
" See State v. Evans, 796 P.2d 178 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990).
21 Confusion exists as to what column of the "scorecard" Vermont should be placed in be-
cause of State v. DeLaBruere, 577 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1990). Some commentators believe that De-
LaBruere holds that Chapter I, Article 3 of the Vermont Constitution requires the use of the ra-
tional basis test. See Robert F. Drinan, Reflections on the Demise of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Ac4 86 GEo. LJ. 101, 117 (1997) ("Only Vermont has accepted Smith's more narrow interpreta-
tion of religious freedom."); David H.E. Becker, Note, Free Exercise of Religion Under the New York
Constitution, 84 CoRNELL L. REv. 1088, 1120 n.243 (1999) (stating that the Vermont Supreme
Court adopted a standard similar to Smith under its state constitution in State v. DeLaBruere);
Yehuda M. Braunstein, Note, WillJewish Prisoners Be Boerne Again? Legislative Responses to City of
Boerne v. Flores, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2333, 2372-73 n.361 (1998) (stating that, after State v.
DeLaBruere Vermont follows Smith level of scrutiny), while others believe that the Vermont Con-
stitution requires the compelling interest test after DeLaBruere. See Michael W. McConnell, Insti-
tutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 155 n.11
(1997) (stating DeLaBruere holds that the Vermont Constitution rejects the reasoning of Smith
and requires the use of the compelling interest test); Seymour Moskowitz & Michael J. DeBoer,
Wzen Silence Resounds: Clergy and the Requirement to Report Elder Abuse and Neglec 49 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1, 79 n.500 (1999) (citing to DeLaBruere for the proposition that Vermont Constitution
requires strict scrutiny); Lauren D. Freeman, The Child's Best Interests vs. The Parent's Free Exercise
of Religion, 32 COLum. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 73, 84 n.62 (1998) (stating that State v. DeLaBruere
stands for the proposition that the Vermont Constitution requires strict scrutiny). Still other
commentators believe that the question as to the proper level of scrutiny afforded under the
free exercise clause of the Vermont Constitution has not yet been answered. Seejon J. Aho, A
Case of Good Intentions: The Vermont Supreme Court and State Constitutional Protection of Civil Rights
and Liberties, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1845, 1857-58 (1997) ("If, as interpreted by the DeLaBruere Court,
Article 3 of the Vermont Constitution must be read as providing only the same level of protec-
tion available under the federal Constitution, since the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 was eventually held to be unconstitutional, does the Vermont Constitution automatically
incorporate the Smith "rational basis" test for free exercise claims; or does it continue to provide
for a strict scrutiny test, and thereby provide for greater protection than the federal Constitu-
tion? This question has yet to be answered.") (internal citations omitted).
"'R .I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1-3 (1998).
. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571 (b) (1997).
.14 775 IL. COMP. STAT. 35 (1998).
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and Idaho2 9-- have enacted laws requiring the state to prove a com-
pelling interest that cannot be satisfied by any less restrictive alterna-
tive means whenever a neutral and generally applicable law infringes
a person's faith.220  Furthermore, in November 1998, the people of
Alabama amended their state constitution to mandate evaluation of
across-the-board laws under the compelling interest test.
22'
In contrast to the twenty states that have instated strict scrutiny of
neutral laws of general applicability after Smith, only two states-Ten-
nessee 222 and Oregon2 2 3 -have concluded that their state constitutions
confer the same level of protection as the federal Constitution and
follow the rational basis test established by Smith.224 The "scorecard"
211 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.01 (West 1998).
26 S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-30 (Law. Co-op. 1999).
17 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1493 (1999).
2" TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110 (West 1999).
211 IDAHO CODE § 73-402 (Michie 2000).
' For discussions of state RFRAs and reactions to them, see Christopher E. Anders & Rose
A. Saxe, Effect of a Statutory Religious Freedom Strict Scrutiny Standard on the Enforcement of State and
Local Civil Rights Laws, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 663 (1999); Thomas C. Berg, The New Attacks on Re-
ligious Freedom Legislation and Why They Are Wrong, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 415 (1999); Lee Boothby
& Nicholas P. Miller, Prisoner Claims for Religious Freedom and State RFRAs, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
573 (1999); Erwin Chemerinsky, Do State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts Violate the Establishment
Clause or Separation of Powers, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 645 (1999); Maryjean Dolan, The Constitu-
tional Flaws in the New Illinois Religious Freedom Act: Why RFRAs Don't Work, 31 LOYOLA U. CHIC.
L.J. 153 (2000); Gary S. Gildin, A Blessing in Disguise: Protecting Minority Faiths Through State Relig-
ious Freedom Non-Restoration Acts, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 411 (2000); Issac M. Jaroslawicz,
How the Crinch Stole Chanukah, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 707 (1999); Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against
Legislative Codification of Religious Liberty, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 565 (1999); Robert M. O'Neil, Re-
ligious Freedom and Nondiscrimination: State RFRA Laws Versus Civil Rights, 32 U.C. DAvIS L. REv.
785 (1999); Cheryl Rubenstein, Legislating Religious Liberty Locally: The Possibility of Compelling
Conflicts, 19 REv. LITIG. 289 (2000); Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemp-
tions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465 (1999); Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemp-
tions-A Research Agenda with Test Suites 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595 (1999).
." SeeALA. CONST., amend. No. 622 (ratifiedJan. 6, 1999).
'n See Wolf v. Sundquist, 955 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. CL App. 1997); State v. Loudon, 857
S.W.2d 878 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).
.. See Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 903 P.2d 351 (Or. 1995).
' Courts in three other states had the opportunity to determine the proper level ofjudi-
cial scrutiny afforded by their state constitutions after Smith, but neglected to do so. Both Utah
and NewJersey failed to do a separate state constitutional evaluation in conjunction with their
First Amendment analysis. SeeJeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1249 (Utah 1998) (stating that the
court will not determine whether the Utah Constitution provides protection over and above
that provided by the First Amendment of the federal Constitution); S. Jersey Catholic Sch.
Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa, 696 A.2d 709, 715 (N.J. 1997) ("As the federal jurisprudence con-
ceruing the Religion Clauses now stands, there is no need to consider whether our State Consti-
tution affords greater religious protection than that afforded by the First Amendment."). The
third state, California, has an interesting history of this issue. In 1996, the Supreme Court of
California had the opportunity to decide the proper level of analysis afforded by its constitu-
tion's Free Exercise Clause in Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal.
1996), but declined to use this case to determine the issue. Id. at 931. ("Because Smith's claim
fails even under that [compelling interest] test ... we need not address the scope and proper
interpretation of California Constitution Article 1, Section 4."). Yet, the Governor of California
mistakenly believed that the California Supreme Court had decided the issue ofjudicial scrutiny
and gave this as one of his reasons for vetoing legislation that would have required strict scru-
tiny to be used when analyzing free exercise claims under the state constitutions. SeeVeto Mes-
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approach to the third Edmunds factor, then, recommends adoption of
the compelling interest test under article I, section 3 to assess all im-
positions on religious liberty-whether intended or created inadver-
tently by neutral laws of general applicability.
B. The Reasoning of Related Case-Law from Other States Further
Endorses Adoption of the Compelling Interest Test Under
Article I, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
The Pennsylvania courts have not been particularly consistent in
their reasoning for citing cases from otherjurisdictions. At times, the
mere fact that a case was decided on state constitutional grounds and
not solely under federal precedents is the lone explanation provided
for discussing a case from anotherjurisdiction.s On other occasions,
the Pennsylvania courts have explored cases from other states solely
to argue why the reasoning employed in those decisions was flawed
and should not be accepted. 6 The soundest approach, however, has
been to examine decisions from states that have either a constitu-
tional text or relevant history similar to that of Pennsylvania. 7
sage of Governor Pete Wilson, California Dep't of Consumer Affairs Legislative Digest-Relig-
ious Freedom Protection Act, A.B. No. 1617 (Sept. 28, 1998), at http://wvv.dca.ca.gov/legis/
abl617.htm. Also, shortly after Smith, the California's Second District Court of Appeal held that
the California Constitution required strict scrutiny, Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous.
Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), rev. granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), rev. dis-
missed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993), but this opinion was later de-published by the California Su-
preme Court. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 281 n.10 (Alaska
1994). California's Court of Appeal, however, held in Brunson v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 85
Cal. Rptr. 2d 710, 713 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), that the rational basis test discussed in Smith is ap-
plicable to free exercise claims under the California Constitution.
2 See Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 905-06 (Pa. 1995) (Montemuro, J., concur-
ring) (citing with approval decisions from states that decided only under their state constitu-
tions whether a warrantless search of an automobile isjustified after its occupants had been ar-
rested); Commonwealth v. Glass, 718 A.2d 804, 809-10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (discussing cases
from states that had determined whether anticipatory warrants violated their state constitu-
tions), aff'd by 754 A.2d 655 (Pa. 2000); Commonwealth v. Rosenfelt, 662 A.2d 1131, 1142-44
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (discussing with approval cases from states that determined whether war-
rantless searches of a parolee's car trunk violated their state constitutions instead of relying
solely on federal precedent).
226 See Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 723 A.2d 162, 169 (Pa. 1999) (declining to accept the re a-
soning of cases from Indiana and Mississippi when determining that the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion's right to counsel attached the same time as the Sixth Amendment right); Commonwealth
v. Hayes, 674 A.2d 677, 681 (Pa. 1996) (declining to accept the reasoning of the Oregon and
Colorado courts when determining that Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
does not provide a right to refuse a sobriety test); Commonwealth v. Craft 669 A.2d 394,395-96
(Pa. Super. CL 1995) (declining to accept the reasoning of the Alaska and Minnesota_ courts
when determining that the Pennsylvania Constitution does not require contemporaneous re-
cording of defendant's statements).
'" See Commonwealth v. Crouse, 729 A.2d 588, 597 (Pa. 1999) (discussing case from New
Jersey, a state that protects privacy rights similarly as Pennsylvania, to determine that a protec-
tive sweep of a residence does not violated Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion); Commonwealth v. Waltson, 724 A.2d 289, 292 (Pa. 1998) (citing cases from states that are
consistent with Pennsylvania jurisprudence on the issue of individual privacy rights); Common-
wealth v. Williams, 692 A.2d 1031, 1038 (Pa. 1997) (citing with approval decisions from states
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The principal reason that courts from other states have endorsed
application of the compelling interest test to encumbrances on relig-
ion wrought by neutral laws of general applicability has been the
text228 and history of the state constitutional provision. Significantly,
the text and history of the constitutions in those states employing
strict scrutiny are identical in significant particulars to the text of arti-
cle I, section 3, its colonial precursors, or the history of religious lib-
erty in the Commonwealth.
Several states have reasoned that the fact that the state constitu-
tion-like article I, section 3-constrains not only control of, but also
"interference" with, religious liberty mandates strict scrutiny of unin-
tended burdens imposed by neutral laws of general applicability. In
Humphrey v. Lane,229 the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that because
the Ohio Constitution's religious freedom clause,2 ° provides "nor
that had previously found greater protections under their state constitutions as compared to the
federal Constitution when determining that parolees and probationers have a diminished ex-
pectation of privacy); Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769, 775 (Pa. 1996) (citing with ap-
proval state decisions that rejected the reasoning of Hodari D. because, like Pennsylvania, these
states had a history of providing greater protection to the privacy of individuals); Common-
wealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 900-01 (Pa. 1991) (agreeing with the reasoning employed by
the courts in NewJersey, Connecticut, and North Carolina, all states that have similar jurispru-
dence to Pennsylvania, in their rejection of the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule);
In re B.C., 683 A.2d 919, 928 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (agreeing with the analysis of court decisions
from states that have a history of providing greater protection of privacy under their state con-
stitutions to determine that the "plain feel" doctrine did not violate the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion).
In other cases, there is no definable pattern explaining why the court chose to look at the
particular cases it analyzed. See Commonwealth v. Zhahir, 751 A.2d 1153, 1160-61 (Pa. 2000)
(discussing reasoning of New York case that rejects the "plain feel" doctrine and a Connecticut
case that accepts the "plain feel" doctrine under its state constitution); Commonwealth v. Cass,
709 A.2d 350, 362-64 (Pa. 1998) (citing cases from states that afford higher and lower protec-
tions of privacy under their state constitutions in determining whether the level of protection
afforded to public school students under article I, section 8); Commonwealth v. Swinehart, 664
A.2d 957, 965-67 (Pa. 1995) (analyzing cases from states that followed and did not follow the
United States Supreme Court reasoning in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), in
determining the type of immunity that properly preserved the privilege against self-
incrimination under their state constitutions); UA Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia,
635 A.2d 612, 619 (Pa. 1993) (stating only that no other state court had determined that a his-
toric designation is a taking under its state constitution); Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
626 A.2d 537, 54748 (Pa. 1993) (discussing cases only from Alabama and Rhode Island that
stated thatjuries consisted of twelve persons under their state constitutions); Commonwealth v.
J.B., 719 A.2d 1058, 1064-66 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (discussing why cases cited by the appellant
do not determine whether individualized searches of public school students require probable
cause under the Pennsylvania Constitution); Commonwealth v. Carroll, 628 A.2d 398, 414-17
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (Johnson,J., dissenting) (discussing rationale of states that both accepted
and rejected the reasoning of Hodari D.).
' Even where the text of the state constitution is identical to the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution, courts have felt free to apply strict scrutiny to laws of general appli-
cability that burden a religious practice. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874
P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994); St. John's Lutheran Church v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 830 P.2d 1271
(Mont. 1992); Davis v. Church ofJesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 852 P.2d 640 (Mont. 1993).
728 N.E.2d 1039 (Ohio 2000).
The Ohio Constitution provides:
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the
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shall any interference with the rights of conscience be permitted,, 231 it
affords broader protection than the First Amendment proscription of
any law "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] .232 In Humphrey, a
male correctional officer claimed that the prison's grooming policy
violated his right to freely exercise his religious beliefs. 3 The officer,
who wore his hair as part of his practice of Native American Spiritual-
ity, believed that a man's hair is part of his spiritual essence and
should only be cut on certain occasions .2 m The court held that the
Ohio Constitution's ban on any "interference" makes even indirect
effects on religious practices unconstitutional absent a compelling
state interest that cannot be satisfied by means less restrictive of the
plaintiff's religion.2Z' Applying this level of scrutiny, the court found
that the prison's grooming policy could be served by the less restric-
tive manner of allowing the correctional officer to pin his hair under
his uniform cap.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the language of Article I,
Section 16 of the Minnesota Constitution 2 7-which is similar to both
Article I, Section 7 of the Ohio Constitution and Article I, Section 3
of the Pennsylvania Constitution-is "distinctively stronger" than its
federal counterpart.2m The court noted that Article I, Section 16 of
dictates of their own conscience. No person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or sup-
port any place of worship, or maintain any place of worship, against his consent; and no
preference shall be given by law, to any religious society; nor shall any interference with
the rights of conscience be permitted. No religious test shall be required as a qualifica-
tion for office, nor shall any person be incompetent to be a witness on account of his re-
ligious belief; but nothing herein shall be construed to dispense with oaths and affirma-
tions. Religion, morality, and knowledge, however, being essential to good government,
it shall be the duty of the general assembly to pass suitable laws to protect every religious
denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public worship, and to en-
courage schools and the means of instruction.
OHIO CONST. arL I, § 7.
O'Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1044 (Ohio 2000).2 Id.
Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1041.
2 Id.
2Smid.
Id. at 1047.
The Minnesota Constitution states:
The enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not deny or impair others retained
by and inherent to the people. The right of every man to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any man be compelled
to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any religious or ecclesias-
tical ministry, against his consent; nor shall any control or interference with the rights of
conscience be permitted or any preference be given by law to any religious establishment
or mode of worship; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so con-
strued as to excuse acts of licentiousness orjustify practices inconsistent with the peace
or safety of the state, nor shall any money be draw from the treasury for the benefit of
any religious societies or religious or theological seminaries.
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16.
2" State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990). In Hershberger, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court addressed whether a generally applicable law requiring the attachment of an or-
ange triangle to slow moving vehicles violated the rights of the Amish faith to freely exercise
their religion under the Minnesota Constitution after the United States Supreme Court re-
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the Minnesota Constitution expressly grants affirmative rights in the
area of religion whereas the First Amendment is written to restrain
governmental action. 23 9  The court reasoned that while the First
Amendment constrains only governmental prohibition of the exer-
cise of religion, Section 16 forbids "even an infringement on or an in-
terferencewith religious freedom."
240
Like the Ohio and Minnesota courts, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court relied upon the textual injunction against interference with re-
ligious liberty in holding that the Wisconsin Constitution affords
more liberal protection of religious freedom than the First Amend-
ment of the federal Constitution.242 The court reasoned that the lan-
guage of the Wisconsin Constitution
operate [s] as a perpetual bar to the state... from the infringement, control
or interference with the individual rights of every person .... They presup-
pose the voluntary exercise of such rights by any person or body of per-
sons who may desire, and by implication guaranty [sic] protection in the
243
freedom of such exercise.
Accordingly, the court concluded that it would apply the compelling
interest test to all claims of religious infringement under the Wiscon-
sin Constitution.
manded the case for further consideration in light of Employment Division v. Smith. See Hershber-
ger, 462 N.W.2d at 395.
" a
210 Id. The court also cited to the preamble as supporting strict scrutiny under the Minne-
sota Constitution. Similar to the Preamble of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Preamble to
the Minnesota Constitution states: "We, the people of the state of Minnesota, grateful to God
for our civil and religious liberty, and desiring to perpetuate its blessings and secure the same to
ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution." Id, at 398 (quoting
MINN. CONST. pmbl.).
The Wisconsin Constitution provides:
The right of every person to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of con-
science shall never be infringed; nor shall any person be compelled to attend, erect or
support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, without consent; nor shall any
control of, or interference with, the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference
be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship; nor shall any money
be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theologi-
cal seminaries.
WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18.
.4 State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 239 (Wis. 1996).
2 Miller, 549 N.W.2d at 239 (quoting State ex rel. Weiss v. Dist. Bd., 76 Wis. 177, 210-11, 44
N.W. 967 (1890)) (emphasis added).
244 Id. at 239. In two other states-North Carolina and Kansas-whose constitutions guard
against "interference with the right of conscience," the courts likewise have held that all bur-
dens on religion will be scrutinized under the compelling interest test, although these courts
have not expressly relied upon textual analysis to reach this conclusion. See In re Browning, 476
S.E.2d 465 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Evans, 796 P.2d 178 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990); Rupert v.
City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992). As mentioned earlier, see supra note 211, there is con-
fusion about the level of scrutiny afforded by the Vermont Constitution after State v. DeLaBruere,
577 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1990). However, it should be noted that the Free Exercise Clause of the
Vermont Constitution is worded similarly to Article I, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion. The Vermont Constitution states:
That all men have a natural and unalienable right, to worship Almighty God, according
to the dictates of their own consciences and understandings, as in their opinion shall be
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Several other state courts applying strict scrutiny to neutral laws
have pointed to language in their constitutions that mirrors the colo-
.tu• 245.nial precursors to the Pennsylvania Constitution in assuring that the
right of conscience may not be "molested or prejudiced," provided
that the exercise of religion does not violate the "peace or safety" of
the civil order. In Society offesus of New England v. Boston Landmarks
Commission,246 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts consid-ered whether a landmark preservation ordinance violated the relig-
regulated by the word of God; and that no man ought to, or of right can be compelled to
attend any religious worship, or erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any
minister, contrary to the dictates of his conscience, nor can any man be justly deprived
or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on account of his religious sentiments, or pecu-
lia[r] mode of religious worship; and that no authority can, or ought to be vested in, or
assumed by, any power whatever, that shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner
control the rights of conscience, in the free exercise of religious worship. Nevertheless,
every sect or denomination of christians ought to observe the Sabbath or Lord's day, and
keep up some sort of religious worship, which to them shall seem most agreeable to the
revealed will of God.
VT. CONST. ch. I, art 3.
When the Vermont Supreme Court analyzed chapter I, article 3 in State v. DeLaBruere its
analysis and conclusions were similar to those of courts in Ohio, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. In
DeLaBrere, church doctrine enjoined its members from sending their children to public
schools. DeLaBruere 577 A.2d at 259. The parents of the children were charged with violating
Vermont's Compulsory Education Statute for failing to send their children to an approved pub-
lic or private school. Id The parents claimed that the statute violated their freedom of religion
under both the United States and Vermont Constitutions. Id. Before the court decided the
state constitutional issue, it first analyzed the federal free exercise claim using the compelling
interest test. I&. at 261. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court had recently
decided Employment Division v. Smith. Because the State had shown a compelling interest, the
court determined that the State also would meet the rational basis required by Smith. See De-
LaBnrere, 577 A.2d at 263 n.10.
After determining that Vermont's Compulsory Education Statute did not violate the par-
ent's free exercise of religion under the First Amendment using the compelling interest test,
the Vermont Supreme Court turned to the state constitutional issue. The court first analyzed
the text of chapter I, article 3 and concluded that article 3 "prohibits 'mere interference' in the
rights of conscience in the free exercise of religious worship." DeLaBruer 577 A.2d at 269
(quoting Beauregard v. City of SaintAlbans, 450 A.2d 1148, 1152 (Vt. 1982)) (emphasis added).
The court then discussed the history of chapter I, article 3 and the State of Vermont. The court
noted that the original version of article 3 in the 1777 Constitution adopted language from the
Pennsylvania Constitution. However, the Framers added language to limit the protection of the
anti-discrimination portion of article 3 to only those citizens who practiced Protestant religions
because the Framers "were fearful that the religious liberty allowed by the Pennsylvania version
would be somewhat larger than the people of New England had been accustomed." DeLaBruere,
577 A.2d at 269. In the 1786 version of the Vermont Constitution, the language protecting only
Protestants was deleted. Id. The court then considered the history of Vermont, but concluded
that religion in the State of Vermont was not deemed any more important than that of the na-
tion as a whole. Id at 272. Finally, the Vermont Supreme Court chose not to accept the defen-
dants' proposition that the Vermont Constitution afforded greater protection than the First
Amendment analysis that the court developed earlier in its opinion. Id. Ultimately, the Ver-
mont Supreme Court concluded that its historical and textual analysis of article 3 did not com-
pel a different result than the federal Constitutional analysis. Id, The court then held that the
compulsory education statute did not violate Chapter I, Article 3 of the Vermont Constitution
because the State's compelling interest could not be achieved by a less restrictive alternative. Id.
.. See supra Part M (B).
"' 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990).
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ious rights of a Jesuit group.247 The Free Exercise Clause of the Mas-
sachusetts Constitution provides:
[N]o subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty,
or estate, for worshipping GOD in the manner and season most agree-
able to the dictates of his own conscience; or for his religious profession
or sentiments; provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or obstruct
others in their religious worship.248
The court reasoned that this "provision contemplates broad pro-
tection for religious worship" and guarantees religious liberty subject
only to the condition that a person's free exercise of religion not dis-
turb the public peace or religious worship of others.249 Based on the
text, as well as the history and intent of the drafters,' the court de-
termined that the government needed a compelling reason to justify
the restraints on the free exercise of religion under the Massachusetts
Constitution, and that historic landmark preservation is not a suffi-
ciently compelling interest to merit infringement of the Jesuit's relig-
ious exercise.
The Washington Supreme Court held a similar text of the state
constitution calls for application of the compelling interest test to a
city landmark preservation ordinance that inhibited a church's ability
to use the exterior of the church building as it desired.252 Article I,
Section 11 of the Washington Constitution states:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, be-
lief, and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one
shall be molested or disturbed in person or property on account of relig-
ion; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so con-
strued as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent
23with the peace and safety of the state.
The court reasoned that the inclusion of the verb "disturbed" in the
state constitution bespeaks a much more expansive protection than
the First Amendment, which only limits governmental acts that "pro-
25hibit" free exercise. 4 Furthermore, unlike the First Amendment,
"' Id. at 572.
... Id. at 572 (quoting MASS CONST. art. 2).
V9 Socy ofJesus, 564 N.E.2d at 573.
'o The court stated that one of the main objectives of the Massachusetts Constitution Dec-
laration of Rights was "to secure and establish the most perfect and entire freedom of opinion,
as to tenets of religion, and as to the choice of the mode of worship." See id. (quoting Adams v.
Howe, 14 Mass. 340, 346 (1817)). The court made note of the definition of "free exercise"
given by one county's delegates at the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention as indicative of
the drafters' intent as to how broadly the right should be interpreted. That definition was:
"[E]very man has an unalienable right to enjoy his opinion in matters of religion, and to wor-
ship God in that manner that is agreeable to his own sentiments without any control whatsoever."
Id. at 573 (quoting The Instructions of Pittsfield (1779), reprinted in MASSACHusETrs, COLONY TO
COMMONWEALTH, at 118 (RobertJ. Taylor ed. 1972)) (emphasis added by the court).
" Soc'y of Jesus of New England v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571, 574
(Mass. 1990).
.. First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 177 (Wash. 1992).
Id at 186 (quoting WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11).
2 Id.
[Vol. 4:1
CODA TO WILUAM PENN'S OVERTURE
section 11 decrees "absolute" protection for religious freedom absent
a violation of "peace and safety. "25" The court concluded that the text
and history 2s of the Washington Constitution require strict scrutiny
and held that the preservation ordinance did not prevent a grave
danger to the public health, peace, or welfare and thus did not serve
a compelling state interest.
While state courts generally have construed constitutional texts
that are identical to the Pennsylvania Constitution or its colonial pre-
cursors to demand strict scrutiny of burdens on religion imposed by
neutral laws, the Oregon and Tennessee courts have adopted the
deferential rational basis test for their state constitutions.2 Neither
the Oregon nor Tennessee courts, however, reasoned that their con-
stitutional language requires or implies use of the rational basis test.29
To the contrary, the courts conceded that the text of the state consti-
tution provided stronger protection of religious liberty than the First
Amendment. 26° Nonetheless, the courts chose to follow precedents in
which the language of the state charters was not analyzed.2 6' Accord-
ingly, the Oregon and Tennessee decisions offer no reasoned justifi-
cation for interpreting the text of the Pennsylvania Constitution in
lockstep with the First Amendment.
.Justice Utter, in his concurrence, stated that, unlike the First Amendment, Article I, Sec-
tion 11 expressly limits the governmental interests that may burden religious freedom and a
court "should start with the assumption that government may not interfere with [a] sincerely
held religious belief and religious practice." First Covenant Church, 840 P.2d at 192 (Utter, J.,
concurring).
The court pointed out that Washington has a lengthy history of extending strong pro-
tection to the free exercise of religion and that the "active, broad language" of Article I, Section
11 of the Washington Constitution remained unchanged throughout the amendments of the
provision. Id. at 186.
"' First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 188 (Wash. 1992). The
language of the New York and Maine Constitutions similarly guarantee religious liberty so long
as the exercise of religion does not disturb the peace of the state. See N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 3
("The liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licen-
tiousness, orjustify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this state."); ME. CONsT.
art. 1, § 3 ("All individuals have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God ac-
cording to the dictates of their own consciences ... provided that that person does not disturb
the public peace .... "). The courts of these two states have determined that their constitu-
tions require the use of the compelling interest test, although they did no textual analysis. See
Rourke v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 603 N.Y.S.2d 647 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993), affd, 615
N.Y.S.2d 470 (App. Div. 1994); Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992).
"" Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 903 P.2d 351 (Or. 1995); Wolf v. Sundquist, 955
S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Loudon, 857 S.W.2d 878 (Tenn. Grim. App. 1993).
2 Article I, Section 2 of the Oregon Constitution provides: "All men shall be secure in the
Natural right, to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences."
Article I, section 3 provides: "No law shall in any case whatever control the free exercise, and
enjoyment of religious opinions, or interfere with the rights of conscience."
Meltebeke, 903 P.2d at 361; Wolf 955 S.W.2d at 630.
The Oregon court followed Salem College & Academy, Inc. v. Employment Div., 695 P.2d 25
(Or. 1985) and Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445 (Or. 1986), vacated and remanded on other,
unrelated grounds, 485 U.S. 660 (1988). The Tennessee Supreme Court followed Harden v. State,
216 S.W.2d 708 (Tenn. 1948) and State ex rel Swann v. Pack 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975).
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Apart from the text of the state constitutions, courts have found
support for the compelling interest test in state history of religious
tolerance that is analogous to Penn's "Holy Experiment." The Min-
nesota Supreme Court noted that early settlers of the region had
come from a variety of religious backgrounds and may have been vic-
tims of religious intolerance in their native countries. 62 The Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court likewise relied on the genealogy of its citizenry in
adopting the compelling interest test:
Wisconsin, as one of the later states admitted into the Union, having be-
fore it the experience of others, and probably in view of its heterogene-
ous population ... has, in her organic law, probably furnished a more-
complete bar to any preference for, or discrimination against, any relig-
ious sect, organization or society than any other state in the Union.
The court concluded that the drafters of the Wisconsin Constitution
created a document that embodied the ideal that the religiously di-
verse citizenry of Wisconsin should be free to exercise the dictates of
their religious beliefs. As has been previously analyzed,2  Pennsylva-
nia was founded upon the same profound respect for religious diver-
sity and tolerance that can be ensured only by insisting upon proof of
a compelling state interest no less restrictive alternatives before sacri-
ficing individual faith to demands of the civic order.
In sum, interpreting Article I, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution to require proof of compelling interest for all invasions of
religious exercise is in keeping with both the scorecard of other state
constitutions, as well as with the textual and historic parallels between
the Pennsylvania Constitution and the charters of those states that
have been construed to apply strict scrutiny after the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Smith.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FAVOR STRICT SCRUTINY
UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 3 OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION
The fourth and final factor the Edmunds court identified as neces-
sary for a proper analysis of a Pennsylvania constitutional provision is
"policy considerations, including unique issues of state and local con-
cern, and applicability within modem Pennsylvania jurisprudence. " 2 5
While difficult to categorize with precision, the courts in Pennsylvania
generally have applied this factor in two different manners. First, the
courts have focused on Pennsylvania's unique history and laws in de-
6 State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. 1990) (citing State v. French, 460
N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990)).
State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d at 239 (quoting State ex reL Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d
at 165, 115 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1962)).
See supra Part Ill.
Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895.
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termining how certain policy considerations should be addressed.266
Second, the courts have simply tried to discern an interpretation of
the constitution that is consistent with "good policy.",2 67  In divining
See Commonwealth v. Zhahir, 751 A.2d 1153 (Pa. 2000) (stating that the Pennsylvania
Superior Court's declaration that "guns follow drugs" in Commonwealth v. Patterson, 591 A.2d
1075 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) does not affect the validity of the frisk, but does clash with the total-
ity of the circumstances standard employed by Pennsylvania when determining when a frisk is
valid under the Pennsylvania Constitution); Wertz v. Chapman Township., 741 A.2d 1272, 1279
(Pa. 1999) (noting that the lack of a right to a trial by jury under the Pennsylvania Human Rela-
tions Act did not violate the underlying policy of the statute or the right to a trial by jury under
the Pennsylvania Constitution); Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 908 (Pa. 1995) (Mon-
temuroJ., concurring) (noting that the rule developed by the United States Supreme Court in
NewYork v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), allowing the police to search a vehicle after he made a
lawful arrest of the occupant of the vehicle has no place in the jurisprudence and history of
Pennsylvania); UA Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612 (1993) (stating
that a historic designation was not a governmental taking under the Pennsylvania Constitution
because the citizens of Pennsylvania had passed the Environmental Rights Amendment to pre-
serve the "natural, scenic, historic, and aesthetic values of the environment and the citizens of
Philadelphia had passed ordinances to fulfill this state policy of preserving historic buildings");
Commonwealth v. Kohl, 615 A.2d 308, 315 (Pa. 1992) (stating that the implied consent provi-
sions of the Motor Vehicle Code violated Pennsylvania's idea of probable cause under the
Pennsylvania Constitution); Commomvealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991) (discussing
why the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule under the Pennsylvania Constitution
would undermine certain criminal procedure rules that had been adopted to protect the pri-
vacy rights of Pennsylvania's citizens); Commonwealth v. Glass, 718 A.2d 804,812-13 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1998) (stating that anticipatory warrants are compatible with Pennsylvania's long history of
protecting privacy rights under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution) reaff'd by
Commonwealth v. Glass, 754 A.2d 655 (Pa. 2000); Commonwealth v. Rosenfelt, 662 A.2d 1131,
114446 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (stating that because the Pennsylvania Constitution protects pri-
vacy greater than the Fourth Amendment and because of Pennsylvania's strong preference for
warrants, a parole officer cannot search a parolee's trunk, minus exigent circumstances, after
the vehicle is under the control of the officer).
" See Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 723 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. 1999) (stating that allowing the
right to counsel guaranteed under the Pennsylvania Constitution to attach during police inter-
viewing before adversarial criminal proceedings were initiated would complicate the criminal
investigative process); Commonwealth v. Waltson, 724 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1998) (discussing that
the specificity requirement for warrants does not limit a police officer's search of a residence to
a single room when particular contraband could be located anywhere in the residence); Com-
monwealth v. Williams, 692 A.2d 1031, 1039 (Pa. 1997) (stating that parolees must expect a di-
minished right to privacy as a condition of being released from prison); Commonwealth v.
Hayes, 674 A.2d 677, 683 (Pa. 1996) (discussing that because the intrusion of a field sobriety
test is minimal in light of the state's interest in removing impaired drivers from the highway,
article I, section 9 does not allow a person to refuse a field sobriety test); Commonwealth v.
Rodriguez, 614 A.2d 1378, 1383 (Pa. 1992) (stating that allowing police to detain people with-
out probable cause or reasonable suspicion would result in the abandonment of a person's co n-
stitutional right under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution to be free from in-
trusions upon her personal liberty); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 598 A.2d 975, 980 (Pa. 1991)
(stating that judges have an obligation to give "no-adverse-inference" charge to a jury under
Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution in order to protect an individual's privilege
against self-incrimination); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 594 A.2d 281,284-85 (Pa. 1991) (discuss-
ing that protecting victims of sexual abuse does not take precedence over an individual's consti-
tutional right to confront his accusers); Commonwealth v. Crouse, 729 A.2d 588, 598 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 1999) (stating that "protective sweeps" of a residence are a valid police practice as long
as not a pretext for an evidentiary search); Commonwealth v. Glass, 718 A.2d 804, 812-13 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1998) (stating that anticipatory warrants are more protective of individual privacy
rights because neutral magistrates will review the basis for the probable cause and will ensure
that the warrant does not take effect until a specific event occurs or specific amount of time
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which gloss furthers "good policy," the Pennsylvania courts have criti-
cally examined the policies adopted by other courts, including the
United States Supreme Court.2" Both approaches to the fourth Ed-
munds factor favor construing Article I, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution to require proof of a compelling state interest to sustain
burdens on religious faith imposed by neutral laws of general appli-
cability.
A. Pennsylvania Has a Unique History of Protection of
Religious Liberty of Minority Faiths
Hopefully by the twenty-first century, officially endorsed religious
discrimination in America has ceased to be a concern. As Justice
O'Connor recognized in her concurring opinion in Smith, "[f]ew
states would be so naive as to enact a law directly prohibiting or bur-
dening religious practices as such."269  On the other hand,
"[e] specially when a religious belief is held by a small minority of in-
dividuals, legislators may simply be unaware of the crisis of religious
conscience a neutral law may occasion.'270 Thus, it is members of mi-
nority faiths who have the greatest stake in the choice between appli-
cation of the compelling interest and rational basis test to neutral
laws of general applicability under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Perhaps the most unique aspect of Pennsylvania history is its safe-
guarding of the religious liberty of adherents of non-mainstream
elapsed) reaffd by Commonwealth v. Glass, 754 A.2d 655 (Pa. 2000); Commonwealth v.J.B., 719
A.2d 1058, 1066 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (reasoning that the adoption of the reasonable suspicion
standard for student searches in schools will properly balance students' privacy interests with
the school's need to maintain order and discipline); Commonwealth v. Rosenfelt, 662 A.2d
1131 (Pa. Super. CL 1995) (reasoning that once a vehicle is under police control, there is a
greater need to protect the individual's expectation of privacy than the need to secure evidence
or protect the police or public); Commonwealth v. Carroll, 628 A.2d 398 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)
(Johnson, J., dissenting) (discussing that the standard to determine a "seizure" under Hodari D.
makes it difficult for police officers to predict when their actions become a "seizure").
" See Commonwealth v. Zhahir, 751 A.2d 1153 (Pa. 2000) (reasoning that the "plain feel"
doctrine, which has been rejected by some states, is not impractical, difficult to apply, or readily
subject to police excess or abuse); Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769 (Pa. 1996) (stating
that the seriousness of a crime can never be ajustification for ignoring the constitutional rights
of an individual in the context of deciding whether to continue to adhere to the United States
Supreme Court's reasoning in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) adopted in Com-
monwealth v. Carroll, 628 A.2d 398 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586
A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991) (discussing that the underlying principle adopted by the United States Su-
preme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), which states that the exclusionary
rule allows some guilty defendants to go free, is questionable, and that if the reasoning of Leon
were adopted it would promote the dangers of allowing magistrates to serve as "rubber stamps"
and of fostering "magistrate-shopping" by the police).
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990) (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
2,0 Hall, supra note 6, at 553. See also S. REP. No. 103-111, at 1 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1897 ("State and local legislative bodies cannot be relied upon to craft ex-
ceptions from laws of general applicability to protect the ability of religious minorities to prac-
tice their faiths .... ").
[Vol. 4:1
CODA TO WVLUAM PENN'S OVERTURE
faiths. As previously recounted, ' 1 Pennsylvania was founded on the
principle of toleration, affording a sanctuary to those who had been
oppressed by the dominant religion. Throughout Pennsylvania's co-
lonial and constitutional history, freedom of conscience for majority
and minority faiths was secured equally.27 2 The Pennsylvania courts
have consistently acknowledged Pennsylvania's singular respect for
the sanctity of an individual's religious belief, however widely or nar-
rowly shared. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in Updegraph
v. Commonwealth:
Christianity, general Christianity, is and always has been a part of the
common law of Pennsylvania; Christianity without the spiritual artillery of
European countries... not Christianity with an established church, and
tithes and spiritual courts; but Christianity with liberty of conscience to
all men. William Penn and Lord Baltimore were the first legislators who
passed laws in favor of liberty of conscience ....
They [the first colonists] fled from religious intolerance, to a country
where all were allowed to worship according to their own understand-
ing... Every one had the right of adopting for himself whatever opinion
appeared to be the most rational, concerning all matters of religious be-
lief; thus securing by law this estimable freedom of conscience, one of the
271highest privileges, and greatest interests of the human race.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reiterated the Commonwealth's
longstanding policy of protecting all religions from government in-
trusion in Commonwealth v. Palms:.2
4
It seems clear to us that what the founders of the Republic-and also the
framers of our State Constitution-had chiefly in mind, as respects free-
dom of religion, was the prohibition of a State or Established Church or
Religion, and any interference with the right of freedom of conscience
and religious belief-the right to attend or support or to refrain from
supporting any church or ministry, and to have all religious establishments or
modes of worship treated on an equality and without any preference of one over
another.75
The Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Eubanks 6 citing to The
Papers of William Penn, affirmed that Article I, Section 3 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution secures the state's unrivaled guarantee of
"' See supra Part III(A).
"n See supra Part Ill.
Updegraph v. Commonvealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 401-02 (Pa. 1824).
15 A.2d 481 (Pa. 1940).
Id. at 483 (emphasis added). In Andress v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 188 A.2d 709, 713-
14 (Pa. 1963), the court noted that the religious liberty preserved by article I, section 3 was one
of the four basic and fundamental freedoms:
The fundamental rights of ownership of private property, freedom of speech, freedom of
religion, and freedom of the press, are the Hallmarks of Western Civilization. These
four basic Freedoms constitute the fundamental differences which distinguish-and cre-
ate the great impassable gulf which divides-Western Civilization from Communism and
free peoples from peoples who are ruled by a despotic dictator or by an absolute or to-
talitarian form of Government.
2, 512 A.2d 619 (Pa. 1986).
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each individual's inviolable right to discern and practice his personal
understanding of religion:
Pennsylvania, more than any other sovereignty in history, traces its origins di-
rectly to the principle that the fundamental right of conscience is invio-
late. See The Papers of William Penn... In general, thus, our Com-
monwealth is neutral regarding religion. It neither encourages nor
discourages religious belief. It neither favors nor disfavors religious activ-
ity. A citizen of this Commonwealth is free, of longstanding right, to
practice a religion or not, as he sees fit ....
Assessment of burdens on religious liberty imposed by neutral
laws of general applicability under a rational basis test would under-
mine Pennsylvania's unparalleled respect for minority faiths. Under
the rational basis test, courts would automatically sustain legislation
that was enacted in ignorance of or indifferent to the fact that the law
infringes upon tenets of non-mainstream religions. On the other
hand, by applying strict scrutiny, the courts would shield a sincerelyheld religious belief-even if not widely shared2 78-- against unin-
tended infringement unless the government can establish both a
compelling interest and that the state interest cannot be secured in a
manner less restrictive of the religious belief. Certainly the latter ap-
proach is more consonant with Pennsylvania's unique reverence for
the right of each person, without interference, to hold true to his un-
derstanding of his relation to the Creator.
B. The Policy Considerations Underpinning the United States
Supreme Court's Rejection of Strict Scrutiny in Smith
Are Wholly at Odds with the Twin Prongs of Penn's
Vision of Religious Liberty
The second manner in which the Pennsylvania courts have ap-
plied the final Edmunds factor is to examine the policy judgments that
underlie the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the re-
lated provision of the federal Bill of Rights. The policy assessment
that animated the majority's repudiation of strict scrutiny under the
First Amendment in Smith is diametrically opposed to Penn's vision of
religious liberty embodied in Article I, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.
Justice Scalia first rejected application of strict scrutiny to neutral
laws of general applicability as incompatible with a body politic of
variegated faiths:
'n Id at 622. See also Stark et al. Appeal, 72 D. & C. 168, 173 (1950) ("The people of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania did not wait for the fourteenth amendment to protect their
religious freedom. Our Constitution contains as strong a guarantee of religious freedom as can
be found anywhere.").
' Courts have generally found that an individual's religious belief merits constitutional
protection even where the conviction is not accepted by all members of the persuasion or is
.rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths." United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86
(1944).
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If the "compelling interest" test is to be applied at all, then, it must be
applied across the board, to all actions thought to be religiously com-
pelled ... Any society courting such an action would be courting anar-
chy, but that danger increases in proportion to the society's diversity of
religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of
them. Precisely "because we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of peo-
ple of almost every religious preference" [citation omitted] and precisely
because we value and protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford
the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious ob-
jector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of
the highest order. The rule respondents favor would open up the pros-
pect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obliga-
tions of almost every conceivable kind .... 27
Contrary to Justice Scalia's view that respecting pluralism in belief
through exemptions from general laws would imperil society, Penn
believed that the civil order would flourish by tolerating and promot-
ing liberty of conscience for adherents of all belief systems, including
exemption from laws of general applicability that clashed with relig-
ious tenets.'m Even if Justice Scalia was correct in believing that the
Framers of the United States Constitution preferred the needs of the
civil order to religious freedom except in cases of intentional dis-
crimination, the founders of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
plainly viewed the hierarchy in reverse.
The second policy basis of Justice Scalia's Smith opinion is the
supposition that infringement of minority religious liberty is an inevi-
table cost of governance:
[T] o say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permit-
ted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally re-
quired, and that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be dis-
cerned by the courts. It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to
the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious
practices that are not widely engaged in; but that is an unavoidable con-
sequence of democratic government and must be preferred to a system
in which each conscience is a law unto itself .... 2s1
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
See supra Part III (A).
2" Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. Justice O'Connor disagreed with the notion that burdening mi-
nority faiths was an inevitable cost of democratic government:
In my view... the First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights of those
whose religious practices are not shared by the majority and may be viewed with hostility.
The history of our free exercise doctrine amply demonstrates the harsh impact majori-
tarian rule has had on unpopular or emerging religious groups such as the Jehovah's
Witnesses and the Amish.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, likewise rejected the notion
that sacrifice of non-mainstream faiths was inescapable. Id. at 909 (Blackmun,J. dissenting) ("I
do not believe the Founders thought their dearly bought freedom from religious persecution a
'luxury,' but an essential element of liberty-and they could not have thought religious intoler-
ance 'unavoidable,' for they drafted the Religion Clauses precisely in order to avoid that intol-
erance."). These dissents may be properly considered by the courts in interpreting the state
constitution. See Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of
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This rationale too inverts the Penn vision embodied in article I,
section 3. Justice Scalia presumes that absent intentional discrimina-
tion, religious commitments must be subordinated to the demands of
civil society. Penn presupposed that obligations imposed by religious
faith take precedence over civic duties, with certain qualifiers that
would be reflected in a compelling interest limitation. William Penn
certainly did not found a "'Holy Experiment" in a new colony simply
so that non-mainstream faiths would be disadvantaged as an "un-
avoidable consequence" of a democracy rather than of a monarchy.
Penn's view of religious toleration has been codified in the colo-
nial and constitutional precursors to Article I, Section 3 of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution and uniformly enforced through the decisions
of the courts of Pennsylvania. The jurisprudence of other states
whose constitutions resemble the text of Pennsylvania's charters, or
whose history parallels the Commonwealth's abundant protection of
minority faiths, have overwhelmingly supported strict scrutiny of neu-
tral laws of general applicability that burden religion. Affording
more generous protection to non-mainstream religions under the
Pennsylvania Constitution than is granted under the Free Exercise
Clause of the United States Constitution would show no disrespect to
the United States Supreme Court. To the contrary, honoring Penn-
sylvania's unique history and status as a guarantor of religious liberty
is wholly consonant not only with the intent of the drafters of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, but also with the Framers of the United
States Constitution's image of federalism. As Justice Brandeis wrote,
"It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country."282 Applying strict scrutiny under Article I, Section 3 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution would be the twenty-first century's tribute
to the happy incident of William Penn's singular courage and novel
"Holy Experiment."
Supreme Court Reasoning and Result 35 S.C. L. REV. 353, 375-76 (1984).
"' New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting). In
contrast, the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that its construction of individual
rights provisions of the federal Constitution always is constrained by considerations of federal-
ism. SeeSan Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973) ("It must be remem-
bered that every claim arising under the Equal Protection Clause has implications for the rela-
tionship between national and state power under our federal system. Questions of federalism
are always inherent in the process of determining whether a State's laws are to be accorded the
traditional presumption of constitutionality, or are to be subjected instead to rigorous constitu-
tional scrutiny.").
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